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NationalAeronauticsand
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
Reply to Attn of: Q-1 March 1993
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
NASA
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is pleased to submit its Annual Report. This
report covers the period from February 1992 through January 1993 and provides you
with findings, recommendations, and supporting material. We ask you to respond only to
Section II, "Findings and Recommendations." We also respectfully request your
response, even in an interim form, within 3 months of receipt of the enclosed report.
This will permit us to pursue open items in a timely manner.
Our relationship with NASA management over the past year has been most satisfactory.
We are gratified by the confidence shown in us by you and your staff and the thoughtful
consideration given to our analyses and recommendations. Over the next year, we plan
to continue providing NASA with oversight on topics such as the impact of demanding
schedules, Space Station Freedom organizational changes, the progress of the Station's
data management system development, potential problems for the Space Shuttle and
Space Station due to orbital debris, and the Space Shuttle major modification program.
We fully recognize that these are times of tight budgets and shifting priorities. Our
Panel continues to believe that NASA's aeronautics and space programs, both manned
and unmanned, are a vital national resource. We will do everything possible to assist
you in assuring that these programs are pursued safely and productively.
Very truly yours,
Norman R. Parmet
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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I. INTRODUCTION

IINTRODUCTION
The past year was one of significant
accomplishments in many NASA programs.
The Space Shuttle flew successfully and with
greatly improved launch turnaround times.
The Space Station Freedom Program
emerged fi'om its previous uncertainties and
began to mature into a stable program.
Much was learned about the ability of
humans to work in space. Aeronautical
research progrants made significant advances
that should yield benefits for both military
and civilian aircraft programs.
- _= :.
[ _ in past years, the Aerospace Safety
] Advisory Panel (ASAP) provided oversight
i on the safety aspects of many NASA
-_ programs. In addition, ASAP undertook
° three special studies. At the request of the
Administrator, the Panel assessed the
requirements for an Assured Crew Return
Vehicle (ACRV) for the Space Station and
reviewed the organization of the Safety and
Mission Quality function within NASA. At
the behest of the Congress, the Panel formed
an independent, ad hoc, working group to
examine the safety and reliability of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine. Section II
presents "Findings and Recommendations."
Section III consists of "Information in
Support of Findings and Recommendations"
for the reader interested in more details.
Appendices A, B, C and D, respectively,
cover the Panel membership, the NASA
response to the findings and recommenda-
tions in the March 1992 report, a chronology
:-of the Panel's activities during the reporting
! period, and the entire ACRV study report.
The overall impression of the Panel is that
the safety consciousness within NASA
programs has continued the improvement
trend highlighted last year. Nevertheless,
sending humans into space and expanding
the boundaries of atmospheric flight will
always remain difficult and risky endeavors.
NASA must continue its quest for risk
reduction and for achieving the highest
possible level of safety. Safety cannot be
allowed to become "routine," but it also
should not be permitted to paralyze
unnecessarily a vital research venture. It
is in this spirit that the ASAP presents its
concerns. The Panel hopes to continue to
play a role in NASA's safety efforts in the
upcoming year by working closely with
NASA and contractor personnel.
During 1992, Mr. I. Grant Hedrick retired
after many years of service to the Panel.
Mr. George A. Rodney retired as Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality
and ex-officio Panel Member and was
replaced by Colonel Frederick D. Gregory.
Mr. Paul M. Johnstone changed from
consultant to member, and Dr. John G.
Stewart and Mr. John F. McDonald changed
from members to consultants. Dr. George
Gleghorn was appointed to the Panel at the
end of 1992.
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HFINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
Finding_ tl: The Space Station Freedom
Program (SSFP) has progressed considerably
in the past year. The entire effort now
exhibits a degree of stability and continuity
that has previously been absent. The
program-level Safety and Mission Quality
(S&MQ) function, however, is still not being
addressed effectively.
Recommendation #1: NASA should place
special emphasis on better integration of
the S&MQ function into the overall Space
Station Program. Attention should be given
to assuring that the S&MQ function is an
inherent part of the design and production
processes. Areas to be addressed with
significant urgency include software
verification and validation, requirements for
the caution and warning system, and normal
and contingency operations planning.
The Space Station Freedom
Program has established an Assured Crew
Return Vehicle (ACRV) Project Office to
develop requirements and manage the design
of a"lifeboat" vehicle. The Panel examined
the developed ACRV requirements in detail
as part of a special study (see Appendix D).
The ACRV Project Office has established
excellent functional requirements which, if
followed, should greatly reduce the risks
inherent in leaving a crew on the Space
Station without an attached Orbiter.
#2" NASA should develop
an Assured Crew Return Vehicle as a
lifeboat in accordance with the ACRV
Project system requirements and philosophy.
Finding_ #3: To allow robotic replacement
of Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs), the
ORU designs must be robot-compatible.
While progress is being made, the optimum
level of robot compatibility has not yet been
achieved.
Recommendation #3: NASA should set a
goal of maximizing the number of robot-
compatible Orbital Replaceable Units.
Finding_ #4: Considerable progress has been
made in automation capabilities for Space
Station Freedom. However, the inclusion
of the caution and warning system operation
within the overall Integrated Station Executive
software is not scheduled until Mission Build
17, and there are hints that this plan might
be subject to future software reductions and
prioritization.
Recommendation #4: Because of the
important safety role of the caution and
warning system, NASA should provide for
its operation under the Integrated Station
Executive software as early as possible.
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The central development
facilities for the Data Management System
(DMS) may not be adequate to support all
of the software development and testing that
will be required. Also, there is concern over
the adequacy of the access of payload
developers to the software development
facilities.
Recommendation #5: NASA should review
the capacity of its planned central
development facilities for the Data
Management System software to assure that
adequate facilities are available to handle
the load expected for SSF software
development. NASA should also provide
the payload community access to the DMS
as quickly as possible and assure that
payload developers have the facilities and
information they need to complete their
work safely and effectively.
Neither the Timeliner tool being
developed for scheduling Space Station
activities nor the scripts that will be
developed using it appear to be receiving
the same level of verification and validation
as other Data Management System software.
Recommendation #6: The Timeliner
software and the scripts created using it
should be subjected to design verification
and validation consistent with other mission-
critical software.
The Software Support
Environment (SSE) is of critical importance
to the Space Station Freedom Program.
Indeed, it is unlikely that the Space Station
software can be successfully completed
without the tools the SSE offers.
Recommendation #7: NASA should
continue strong support of the development
and use of the Software Support Environ-
ment.
EkldJ:tlg..t_2 The Space Station Freedom
Program has begun the planning and
development of an Integrated Logistics
System, which coordinates the Work
Packages and the Kennedy Space Center.
#8." Continue working on
the plan for the Integrated Logistics System.
B. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
F_/21d/t_,..lE_."The Space Shuttle automatic
landing system needs only minimal additional
analysis and a few system design changes
to extend its performance limits and to
support a complete definition of flight rules
for its use. Cancellation of the detailed test
objective for an automatic landing on the
flight of STS-53 has further delayed the
specification of these capabilities and the
appropriate operational role of the automatic
landing system.
Recommendation #9" Define the
requirements and demonstrate the capability
for an automatic landing system as soon as
possible.
NASA has funded the
development and installation of a Multi-
Purpose Electronic Display System (MEDS)
for retrofit into the Orbiter. This system
will replace the conventional electro-
mechanical instruments with flat panel
displays. Commercial transports and military
aircraft have been flying with MEDS-
equivalent "glass cockpit" systems for some
years, some converted from older,
conventional cockpit displays.
Recommendation #10: The inherent
operational and potential safety benefits of
Multi-Purpose Electronic Display System
warrant its installation in the Space Shuttle
as soon as possible.
F_//ldJ/!g_.t[./_ The inventory of Auxiliary
Power Units is currently being upgraded to
an Improved Auxiliary Power Unit
configuration to improve reliability and
service life. The upgrade program, however,
projects a condition of zero spares in the
future due to time limits on some parts.
Recommendation #11; NASA should take
the steps necessary to preclude a situation
of zero Improved Auxiliary Power Unit
spares.
The Improved Auxiliary Power
Unit represents a major improvement in
durability and safety. However, the Gas
Generator Valve Module (GGVM or 'qgang-
bang" valve) continues to require frequent
replacement because of the high-stress
manner in which the valve operates. There
are alternative valve designs that can be
adapted to perform the same function.
Recommendation _1_" NASA should
continue to explore improved Gas Generator
Valve Module designs with the goal of
providing a replacement for the current
configuration as soon as practicable.
The results of flight tests on
the Orbiter Columbia (OV-102) using
pressure and strain gage measurements on
the wing showed that the calculated ascent
loads on the wing are conservative.
Additional flight tests to be conducted will
measure the pressure distribution and swains
on the wing and tail of OV-102. These data
are required to substantiate that the
predicted applied and internal loads on the
wing and tail are conservative.
_'on #13" Conduct the planned
tests as expeditiously as possible. Particular
emphasis should be placed on the loads on
the tail.
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The Space Shuttle Main
Engine program is doing well and has
sufficient spares. However, the engines still
require meticulous attention to detail in
inspections and tests.
Ret:tmmumdal_tm #14: Continue the vigilant
implementation of the inspection and test
procedures while design solutions for known
weaknesses are being addressed.
F_/tld/tlg__Cd_ The individual major
component improvement programs are
making progress. However, a total engine
upgrade is being delayed because the High
Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) part
of the Advanced Turbopump Program (ATP)
is on hold. The highly effective Large
Throat Main Combustion Chamber
(LTMCC) has finally been made a formal
part of the Space Shuttle Main Engine
program by NASA but has been denied
appropriations by Congress. Schedule
disparities among the various component
improvements lead to interim certifications
of components in engine configurations that
will never fly and to unnecessary duplication
of certification tests.
Ra:,mmumdation #15: The identified Space
Shuttle Main Engine design improvements
are vital to the reduction of Space Shuttle
operational risk. Therefore, NASA should
reinstate the Advanced Turbopump Program
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump develop-
ment; continue to press for approval of the
Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber;
and examine carefully the benefits of
integrating all the individual modifications
into a block change program.
Three Flight Support Motors
have been used to date to verify quality and
qualify design improvements, reproducibility,
and replacement materials for the
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM).
In the near future, new materials will be
needed in the RSRM to replace those
eliminated for environmental or safety
concerns. It will also be necessary to qualify
new vendors to replace those who have left
the industry or are no longer willing to
supply components for the RSRM.
Recommendation #16.- To maintain safety
and performance, NASA should continue
the use of Flight Support Motors for quality
control, validation of design improvements,
and qualification and verification of new
materials, processes, facilities, and equip-
ment.
E/ttl//t/g//_ Soot has been found on the
O-tings serving the Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motor nozzle internal joint number 2
significantly more frequently than on the
similar O-rings for the other four joints
combined. A new assembly sequence with
Room Temperature Vulcanizer (RTV)
backfill is being used to counter this
problem.
Recommauttaion #IZ" The possibility of
heat effect or blowby at the primary seal
of nozzle joint number 2 is sufficiently high
to suggest the need for a redesign of ibis
joint to eliminate the present procedurally
based solution.
The projected factor of safety
of the aft skirt when used on the Advanced
Solid Rocket Motor is less than specified.
Installation of an external bracket has been
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proposedasa means of returning the factor
of safety to the level in the design re-
quirements, A segment of an aft skirt is to
be used to test the effectiveness of the
external bracket modification. The test of
this ll-inch-wide specimen may not duplicate
the actual strains and boundary conditions
that would be experienced by a complete
aft skirt and, therefore, may yield unreliable
results.
R_r-ommcnda_n #l& The effects of the
external bracket modification would be
better evaluated if a full-scale skirt were
tested in the facility that was previously used
for the influence testing of a complete aft
skirt.
Potential stress corrosion
cracking of case welds on the Advanced
Solid Rocket Motor is an acknowledged
problem. The residual stress is not uniform
over the entire weld. Residual stress peaks
can occur at the start and stop of the welding
process.
Rar.ommendzaitm #19: The Advanced Solid
Rocket Motor Program should assess the
adequacy of its stress corrosion cracking test
plan to assure that sufficient pass/fail criteria
tests are included.
The top-level requirements
document for the Advanced Solid Rocket
Motor manufacturing software is not
scheduled to be available until July 1993.
Also, systems integration and systems level
testing plans for the ASRM manufacturing
facility are not yet ready.
Recommaukn_n #20: The overall
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor manufacturing
system software requirements document and
systems integration and test plans are
important parts of the system development.
They should include a comprehensive test
plan and an evaluation mechanism capable
of tracking the system operation through
its lifetime.
The Kennedy Space Center
has begun a pilot Structured Surveillance
Program with the objective of increasing the
efficiency of the quality control function
in order to enhance launch turnaround
processing. This program appears to have
great potential.
Recommendation #21: Before Structured
Surveillance can be fully implemented, it
must be carefully evaluated to assure that
it is fully supportive of safe flight operations.
The use of task teams at
Kennedy Space Center has expanded with
apparently successful results.
#29_- Continue to develop
and use the task team concept. If Structured
Surveillance proves successful, consideration
should be given to integrating it with the
task teams.
A new high bay Orbiter
Prot_..ssing Facility (OPF-3) has been opened
at the Kennedy Space Center. In addition
to advanced support equipment, OPF-3 has
vastly improved lighting, which should
decrease accident risk and increase
productivity.
Reconunantation #23: NASA should
upgrade the lighting in the other Orbiter
Processing Facilities as soon as possible to
avoid differences across the high bays and
maximize safety and productivity.
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E//ld//Ig21_.__ The NASA Shuttle Logistics
Depot has great potential for improving
repair turnaround times and enhancing the
logistics program. At present, however,
repair turnaround times are still significantly
longer than desired due largely to protracted
failure analysis times.
Recommendation #24: The Space Shuttle
Program needs to establish a more effective
method of moving units through the repair
cycle in order to achieve the full potential
of the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot.
F_.itld/_g..t_ Performance of the Space
Shuttle logistics system is excellent and
difficulties such as loss of suppliers are being
diligently addressed and corrected.
Recommatdation #25: Continue placing
the strongest possible emphasis upon
controlling the growth in the number of
below-minimum or zero stock levels. Where
possible, alternative sources should be
qualified or manufacturing and repair
capabilities should be transferred to NASA
facilities such as the NASA Shuttle Logistics
Depot to compensate for the loss of sup-
pliers.
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C. AERONAUTICS
A NASA Headquarters
Aircraft Management Office (AMO) has
been established. The Office is headed by
a senior manager reporting directly to an
Associate Administrator. In addition, a new,
comprehensive NASA Aviation Strfety Officers
Reference Guide has been promulgated.
Recommendaaon #26" NASA should
continue to support a strong Aircraft
Management Office and manage the NASA
Aviation Safety Program in accordance with
the NASA Aviation Safety Officers Reference
Guide. The longstanding and dedicated
Intercenter Air Operations Panel (IAOP)
should be maintained as an independent
entity. Together, the AMO and IAOP,
guided by this reference guide, should be
highly effective in maintaining the safety of
NASA's aviation activities.
NASA maintains a fleet of
aircraft for management and administrative
purposes. Many of these aircraft are old,
and some have even exceeded their originally
specified service lives. Although excellent
maintenance is currently coping with
problems such as stress corrosion due to age,
safety can be compromised if the level of
maintenance decreases.
Recommendation #2Z" NASA should
conduct a review of its aging aircraft and
establish a coordinated program of upgrades,
replacements, and appropriate additional
safety inspections.
Flight research at the Dryden
Flight Research Facility includes a number
of test programs with aircraft, such as
the F-15 and SR-71, that are potentially
hazardous and therefore require a con-
tinuous and detailed safety effort. The
Dryden safety procedures and activities
continue to control the risks associated with
these flight tests.
Recommendaaon #28: Dryden Flight
Research Facility should maintain emphasis
on the practice of periodic reviews of safety
procedures to assure all reasonable risk
reduction measures are being taken.
ORIGINAL PAGE
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D. OTHER
At the request of the NASA
Administrator, the Panel examined the
organizational structure of the Office of
Safety and Mission Quality and the
counterpart organizations at NASA Centers.
The study concluded that the current
organizational arrangement provides an
appropriate and effective relationship
between NASA Headquarters and the
Centers.
Rec.ommendaatm #29: Maintain the current
organizational structure, but clarify the
functions and duties of the Headquarters
Office of Safety and Mission Quality and
those of Center Directors and, if necessary,
issue revised NASA Management
Instructions.
NASA has begun development
of a Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue
(SAFER). SAFER is a small maneuvering
unit intended to fit at the bottom of the
Portable Life Support System (PLSS) of an
extravehicular activity (EVA) astronaut.
Its main purpose would be to permit the safe
recovery of an astronaut who becomes
untethered from the Space Station or an
Orbiter that was operating in a mode which
prevented it from moving quickly for a
recovery. SAFER also provides significant
maneuverability for EVA astronauts, without
the need to carry and deploy the larger
and more complex Manned Maneuvering
Unit (MMU). The SAFER concept has
merit for enhancing safety and im-
proving operational efficiency. The
development program appears to have
proceeded satisfactorily.
Recommendation #30: Because the
requirement for a SAFER as a rescue unit
appears to be well founded, and it has
additional mission benefits, its full-scale
development is recommended as soon as
possible.
The Intelsat repair mission
highlighted the need for additional types of
crew training aids that can augment existing
computerized and underwater simulators
to provide better representation of the
dynamics involved in EVA work efforts.
The virtual reality systems being developed
by NASA and others appear to offer
significant promise for providing some of
the additional training needs.
#31: NASA should begin
a program to assess the benefits of using
virtual reality systems in more aspects of
astronaut training.
In spite of some progress, the
Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom
Programs are still not sufficiently addressing
human factors issues. For example, the
absence of a definitive user console layout
standard between NASA and the Inter-
national Partners for the Space Station could
cause problems for training and on-orbit
operations.
Ra:tmunau/ta/on #32." NASA management
should encourage the active consideration
of human factors issues within the Space
Shuttle and Space Station Freedom
Programs. This might be best accomplished
by requiring the inclusion of someone with
specific human factors training in decision-
making at all levels.
Independent verification and
validation (IV&V) of large software systems
is considered critical to program success.
There has been some confusion over the
14
independent verification and validation
activity for Space Station Freedom Program
and the role of various groups in accom-
plishing it.
Recommendation #33- NASA should
develop a clear definition of what is meant
by independent verification and validation.
This definition should encompass both the
activities to be performed as part of verifi-
cation and validation and the degree of
independence required.
NASA research and test
facilities are a national asset, key to the
United States' continuing leadership in space
and aeronautics. Regrettably, some of the
infrastructure is not being adequately
maintained, and the development of new,
state-of-the-art facilities has been lagging.
Recommendation #74: NASA should
develop an integrated long-range infra-
structure plan that assures the maintenance
of existing assets and develops new facilities
to continue American leadership in space
and aeronautics research and development.
The Tethered Satellite System
deployment failed as a result of a field
modification that was improperly controlled
and tested. The change review process
employed did not uncover the flaw.
Recommendation #35: NASA should
increase its emphasis on complete system
testing when feasible. In addition, care
should be exercised to ensure that changes
to flight systems between completion of the
last total systems test and the flight of the
equipment are properly analyzed, controlled,
and executed.
_/ld///g2f.,_ NASA has embraced the
concept of Total Quality Management
(TQM). However, TQM implementation
across NASA centers and contractors
appears to vary from highly visible and
apparently productive efforts to activities
that seem to have more form than substance.
#36- NASA should review
its internal Total Quality Management
program to assure that it is properly
structured as a support function and includes
not only motivation, but also appropriate
leadership and training for both TQM
instructors and hands-on employees.
F_//Iddf/tg...,#_$_ The Aerospace Medicine
Advisory Committee has produced a report
entitled, "Strategic Considerations for
Support of Humans in Space and
Moon/Mars Exploration Missions (Life
Sciences Research and Technology Program,
Volume 1)." This excellent report contains
a series of recommendations relating to
human exploration in space that pinpoint
areas that NASA should explore prior to
embarking on extended duration space flight.
Recommendation #37" NASA should
address the recommendations contained in
the referenced report in a timely fashion.
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INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
Ref: Finding #1
The Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP)
briefings presented to the Panel during 1992
included several broad Program overviews
as well as more in-depth explorations of
specific areas such as the Data Management
System (DMS) and Assured Crew Return
Vehicle (ACRV). Overall, the information
obtained highlighted how much the program
has improved since the Panel's review last
year. There is an obvious sense of stability
and continuity that was previously lacking.
The program organization and use of panels
and working groups appear reasonable and
capable of getting the job done. The
definition of the role of the Safety and
Mission Quality function, however, is still
vague, and its integration into the project
structure needs to be handled better for
effective performance of its role. The effects
of the shift of some responsibilities from
Reston to the Johnson Space Center (JSC)
announced late in the year will be monitored
by the Panel in the upcoming year.
The SSFP appears to have a clear set of
funct/ona/requirements at the program level.
This, in turn, has resulted in excellent
redundancy analyses and the definition of
a good set of requirements documents. The
current backlog of documents is scheduled
to be "caught up" in the very near future.
Unfortunately, the same level of functional
analysis to support some of the subsystem
requirements and designs is not in evidence.
For example, the caution and warning and
safe haven preliminary designs do not show
the same depth of analysis as the major
SSFP systems. The caution and warning
system and backup Emergency Monitoring
and Display System (EMADS) should be
based on detailed consideration of the
information the crew requires to be able to
select among available countermeasure
response options for each type of situation
covered.
Progress has been made in the design and
production of Space Station hardware. For
example, two of the largest integrated-truss
assembly structural bulkheads have been
rough-machined. Structural test fixtures have
been built, and some structural hardware
has been manufactured for qualification
testing. Also, electric power system com-
ponents have entered functional tests.
The current design philosophy assumes that
a docked Orbiter will be monitored by an
on-board crew member because of an
operations rule which dictates that at least
one crew member will remain on an attached
Shuttle at all times. It might be beneficial
to include two-way monitoring of both an
attached Orbiter and the ACRV in the
caution and warning design. When these
vehicles are at the Space Station, they are
19
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essentiallyadditional pressurizedmodules
whoseoverall health shouldbemonitored.
Moreover, leaving a crew member on the
Orbiter occupiesascarceresourcethatcould
prove invaluable for both nominal and
contingencyoperationson theSpaceStation.
The current plan to have crew members
translatethrough afire, toxic spill, or other
problem in a node to reachthe safehaven
food supplies does not seem to be well
grounded. The argument that this
"standardizes"the crewresponseis neither
compellingnor correct. Thetypical human
responseis to retreat from an emergency
condition rather than attempt to move
through it. Moreover, the placementof all
of the safe haven food on one side of the
nodescaneliminate being ableto usetime
to resolvetheunsafecondition and restore
accessto the regular food supply.
Overall,theproblemsexhibited by the Space
Station Freedom Program are relatively
minor compared to the obvious progress the
program has made. There is a definite
'_vhen wetly" attitude in evidence rather than
the "if we fly" mood which had permeated
the program for years. This is a healthy sign
and bodes well for program success if
funding remains sufficient and the program
managers focus additional attention on the
diminishing number of weak spots.
Ref: Finding #2
See the complete ACRV report in
Appendix D.
Ref: Finding #3
The Space Station is dependent upon the
use of robotics for assembly and mainte-
nance to reduce extravehicular activities
(EVAs) and minimize the crew time devoted
to maintenance. This past year has seen
important progress in defining the role of
robotics in Space Station maintenance,
including:
International agreements on robot
safety and compatibility issues.
A maintenance study to examine the
logistics and operations of Orbital
Replaceable Unit (ORU) changeout
over the 30-year life of the station.
Design of a new ORU subcarrier and
a robotic strategy that could triple
(from 2 to 6) the number of ORUs an
EVA astronaut could change in a single
EVA.
Analysis of the different phases of the
detailed assembly sequence oriented
toward: 1) determining what needs to
be done to assure compatibility between
components so that it is feasible to
complete the assembly; and 2)
determining what support capabilities
must be initiated to allow the assembly
operations to be accomplished.
Considerable progress on developing
robot-compatible ORUs, though there
are still many ORUs that are not robot-
compatible.
An internal vehicle activity (IVA)
maintenance study paralleling the
Fisher-Price EVA study to examine the
time required for internal maintenance
operations. Preliminary results show
that the tasks can be accomplished
within the crew time budget.
A feasibility study for using ground
control of robots for accomplishing
inspection and maintenance tasks found
that this approach is feasible and
should be pursued further.
20
Ref: Finding #4
Space Station automation activities during
the past year fell into two major categories:
1) automation of fault detection,
environment monitoring, and environment
control, and 2) continued development of
expert systems for fault isolation and
recovery.
Considerable progress has been made in
areas such as:
• Detection of hull leaks.
• Fire detection and protection.
• Pressure control.
• Trace contaminant monitoring.
• Water quality monitoring.
Internal thermal control system leak
detection.
Demonstration of a prototype fault
identification system for the thermal
control system.
Construction of a general DMS fault
detection, isolation, and recovery
(FDIR) prototype.
• FDIR activities for the power system.
The Panel was pleased to note that NASA
has utilized a human factors expert in
designing some of the user interfaces, with
impressive results. However, areas of
concern remain. Inclusion of the caution
and warning system operation within the
overall Integrated Station Executive software
is not scheduled until Mission Build 17 and
there are hints that this might be subject
to future software reductions and priori-
tization. Further, NASA does not currently
have an adequate means of integrating the
simulation models and the rule-based fault
isolation systems, as is needed for some
aspects of FDIR. There is also a need for
the capability to integrate the activities of
multiple expert systems.
NASA needs to vigorously pursue the
technical solutions to problems limiting the
development of automatic fault detection,
isolation, and recovery systems during the
upcoming year, before the design progresses
too far.
Ref: Findings #5 and #6
Major DMS organizational changes during
the past 6 months include creation of an
Avionics Systems Manager position. The
current manager was given responsibility for
program-wide avionics integration in addition
to the Work Package 2 (WP-2) avionics
responsibilities previously held. The
Avionics Systems Manager has taken the
positive step of creating a series of
progrmmvide mode and design teams. These
include: 10 Software Mode Teams, a System
Design Team, a System Management Team,
a Program Data Architecture Team, a
Software Design Architecture Team, a
Software Integration Process Team, and an
Avionics Architecture Team.
The DMS is presently in a high state of flux,
with significant design changes in process
at the time this report was being written.
Those changes reviewed for this report, such
as the channelized architecture, appear to
be improvements over the previous design.
While detailed comments on the revised
DMS design would be premature at this
time, a few areas of concern can be noted.
First, the centralization of software
integration and testing has been an
important step forward. However, the DMS
equipment available for testing may be too
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limited to supportall of the verification and
validation activities necessary to ensure
safety.
Second, the people developing the DMS
centralized test facilities have as yet had
little involvement with the payload
developers. Payload developers need to be
brought into the picture soon to ensure
consistent development efforts and safety-
related activities (e.g., caution and warning,
FDIR) that are compatible with DMS
capabilities. Further, it is not clear that the
payload developers have adequate access
to the facilities needed, e.g., DMS kits,
emulators, or software development facilities.
A recent utilization workshop was held, but
a stronger effort is needed.
A system called TimeIiner is being developed
for scheduling activities on the Space Station.
This system is effectively a high-level
programming language that will be used on-
line by the crew as well as from the ground.
Neither the Timeliner system itself nor the
scripts developed by it seem to be
undergoing the same level of development
review and scrutiny as the other software
systems. Yet, Timeliner and its scripts appear
to be very much an on-line control system.
Timeliner scripts can change real-time object
data base (RODB) values as well as inspect
them, and the RODB values are used by
other parts of the DMS system. Therefore,
Timeliner scripts and their utilization should
be subject to the same kinds of design
reviews and verification and validation as
other parts of the DMS.
Ref: Finding #7
The Software Support Environment (SSE)
has been operational for the past year, and
there are a number of work package
contractors using it. The reports from Work
Package 1 (WP-1) have been particularly
favorable toward it, Work Package 4 (WP-4)
is heavily dependent upon it, and WP-2
acceptance and use of the SSE is now
progressing rapidly after a slow start.
The SSE serves very useful and necessary
functions in Space Station software de-
velopment, configuration management, and
documentation control. It now appears to
have cleared many of the obstacles that
plagued its development and use in the past
and is finally serving the function for which
it was created. The importance of the SSE
suggests that it is unlikely that the SSFP
software development can be successfully
completed without the type of tools the SSE
offers.
Ref: Finding #8
Work is proceeding to identify the elements
of the Integrated Logistic System (ILS) for
the SSFP. Full advantage is being taken
of the experience and facilities developed
for the Space Shuttle at the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), although each Work Package
develops and supports its own hardware.
The Logistics Support Analysis base being
evolved at KSC would make that Center
responsible for operations and maintenance,
spares, repairs, and consumable requirements
and resource allocations.
The early development of an Logistics
Support Analysis plan is a step in the
right direction. Detailed contractor design
studies of on-orbit maintenance including
accessibility, replaceability, and human
engineering also appear to be progressing
well.
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B. SPACE SHUTrLE PROGRAM
Ref: Finding #9
Continued operation of the Space Shuttle
over the next 20 or more years leads to a
high probability of the occurrence of one
or more instances in which an automatic
land_ capability will be needed to
landing risk. At least two basic situations
might result in the need for an automatic
landing. The first would involve the inability
of the crew to see the landing runway due
to factors such as deteriorating weather in
the landing site after the deorbit burn, a
partially or fully obscured windshield, or
smoke in the cockpit. The second would
involve the inability of the crew to perform
a safe landing due to subtle or obvious
incapacitation. The requirements for an
automatic landing system to meet these
situations must encompass hardware,
software, and flight rules that are
appropriate in terms of functional
capabilities and reliability for those flight
conditions or scenarios deemed by analysis
and risk management decisions to require
automatic landings. However, NASA has
yet to establish a complete set of flight rules
and associated scenarios for the use of the
automatic landing system. Crews do not
presently train in the use of the automatic
landing system through touchdown, and there
are no defined performance or physiological
measures to indicate when automatic
landings should be made to minimize risk.
The cancellation of the detailed test
objective (DTO) to test an automatic landing
on STS-53 was a setback for the Space
Shuttle Program. This DTO was extremely
conservative and posed little additional risk
for the STS-53 flight. It would have
provided needed flight data to correlate with
and validate the computer models and
simulation experience. It would also have
given the entire Space Shuttle team
experience with and confidence in the use
of the system when required. NASA should
pursue a program leading to the full
operational definition and certification of
the Space Shuttle Automatic Landing
System. This program should include:
Enumeration of scenarios under which
automatic landings might be required
to ensure the safety of the crew and
vehicle.
Risk assessment of these scenarios and
a determination of whether NASA is
willing to accept the identified risk
without use of an automatic landing
system.
Approval of the work already defined
by Rockwell to quanti_ the existing
system's performance limits if the risk
studies indicate a benefit.
Research on measures of crew and
vehicle performance and the environ-
ment to establish criteria for when the
automatic landing system should remain
engaged.
Detemaination of the need for additions
to the system's capabilities, such as the
inclusion of differential Global
Positioning System capability and/or
automating gear and air data probe
deployment.
A few automatic landings as defined
in the DTO for STS-53. These are
needed to correlate actual performance
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data with the computer models used
by NASA and Rockwell and to validate
them.
low altitude takeovers that was considered
necessary in preparation for the STS-53
DTO.
Specification of a final system
configuration and operational rules for
its use.
It is also worth noting that the automatic
landing system employs the same guidance
information that the crew uses with the
exception of the actual scene of the runway
and any landing aids such as Precision
Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights.
Thus, if the crew were unable to see the
runway surface, the reliability of the existing
automatic landing system and the crew flying
only the guidance information would be
similar. In fact, the automatic mode would
theoretically have a higher reliability than
the manual mode since any possible failures
of the Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)
would be irrelevant. The landing dispersions
and, hence, operational safety of the Shuttle
would undoubtedly be superior under limited
visibility conditions when the automatic
landing system is used.
The redundancy of the present system design
does appear deficient with respect to the
arrangement of the three receivers for the
Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
(MSBLS). If one of these disagrees with
the other two, it can be %,oted out."
However, if the remaining two disagree, the
only prudent alternative is to disregard the
MSBLS information and have the crew land
using visual cues. A relatively simple
enhancement of the MSBLS receiver
redundancy arrangement has already been
identified by Rockwell and, if incorporated,
would eliminate this problem. The
automatic system would then be fail-
operational/fail-safe in accordance with the
rest of the system. This would also eliminate
the need for the extensive simulator and
Space Shuttle Training Aircraft training on
It is logical to conclude that a reliable and
safe automatic landing system is a "must"
for the Space Shuttle Program and that little
additional development is required for the
existing system to provide the needed
capability. If the need for extensive and
costly pilot training to counter extremely
unlikely fault conditions at critically low
altitudes can be eliminated, automatic
landings become a manageable adjunct to
Space Shuttle operations that could improve
future landing safety under certain extreme
operational modes and conditions.
Ref: Finding #10
The Multi-Purpose Electronic Display
System (MEDS) retrofit involves significant
engineering, program management, and
configuration control. The functionality of
the existing instruments must be maintained
or improved while substituting a digitally
based display system for the older analog
components. A significant challenge arises
from the need to integrate the new displays
with the existing analog data bus. In
addition, the upgrade must be accomplished
without an undue impact on Shuttle flight
rates.
As part of the MEDS program, emphasis
is being placed on avoiding mixed fleet
operations. A decision has also been made
to emulate the existing displays at the outset
of the changeover. Both of these approaches
may be too conservative and thereby delay
the time when the program will obtain
maximum benefits from the changeover.
Many airlines fly the same aircraft types with
and without glass cockpits and have cross-
qualified their flight and maintenance crews.
With the extensive pre-flight crew training
for Space Shuttle flights and detailed
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paperwork for ground crews, a mixed fleet
should not present a major problem.
The MEDS development and installation
timeline is sufficiently long to permit
formation of a task group to examine the
issues of display contents and mixed fleet
operations. It is theoretically possible to
change displays easily in software. However,
the history of software modifications within
the Shuttle Program would suggest that they
are often a pacing item.
Ref: Findings #11 and #12
A major revision of the Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) design has been introduced into the
fleet. It has been designated the Improved
APU (IAPU) and incorporates many changes
to the original design including: a new
turbine wheel, a "spring" gas generator, a
quad redundant electronic controller, and
a passive thermal control system that
eliminates the need for water sprays onto
the fuel pump and the Gas Generator Valve
Module (GGVM) after shutdown. In
addition, there are numerous changes in
design details such as materials, seals, valve
seats, and manufacturing processes and
techniques.
While the upgrade to the IAPU is being
accomplished, there is a possibility of
reaching a situation in which the program
will have zero spares. This might arise
because of time restrictions on components
such as the GGVM valve seat or because
of the need to re-grease the shaft to prevent
rust as discussed below. This increases the
risk that cannibalization will be needed to
assure a sufficient number of flightworthy
units.
The new "75-hour" turbine wheel has
eliminated the problem of turbine blade root
cracks that had plagued the APU from the
beginning and required extensive inspections
and change-outs of APUs. The new wheel
design eliminates the sharp comers of the
original blade design and provides full
shrouding of the blade tips, making the
wheel a much more rugged device that is
less susceptible to high-cycle fatigue
problems. As a bonus, the new wheel
provides about 5 percent improvement in
operating efficiency.
The "spring gas generator" is an ingenious
and simple mechanical design that keeps
the catalyst bed under pressure, thus
preventing the formation of voids as
operating time is accumulated. Precluding
the formation of voids eliminates the
"roughness" experienced in the gas
generation process (decomposition of
hydrazine) when voids are present and
makes for a smoother running APU.
The new electronic controller with its quad
redundancy has minimized the concern about
overspeeding of the 72,000 rpm turbine with
consequent uncontained blade or wheel
failure. The controller passed its
certification program without significant
problems. Unfortunately, during the design
process, the nature of the interaction of the
controller with the crew's APU Start/Run
switch was overlooked. In the original
controller, the overspeed and underspeed
automatic shutdown functions closed the fuel
tank isolation valve, overriding the flight
deck fuel tank isolation valve switch. The
overspeed and underspeed latches did not
reset when the Start/Run switch was toggled
on-off. With the new controller, these
latches are reset automatically. Consequent-
ly, with the new controller, the crew
procedures for normal and emergency APU
shutdowns are not identical as had been the
case with the original design. Because
automatic closure and latching of the fuel
tank isolation valve is required to prevent
additional vehicle damage after APU loss
due to mechanical failure, the system should
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be designed to use identical procedures.
Fortunately, it was possible to effect a return
to the original mode of crew operation with
a very minor change to circuitry for the fuel
isolation valve driver on the flight deck.
Another problem that has developed is the
discovery of rust formation on the fuel
pump's M-2 steel drive gear. The concern
is potential combustion reaction between
the hydrazine fuel and the rust. Extensive
tests of the compatibility of the rust with
the fuel under operational conditions have
indicated a low potential for a major
reaction. Nonetheless, for the short term,
manufacturing, assembly, and storage
processes have been revised to minimize the
probability of rust formation, and coating
of the affected parts with a special grease
has been implemented. The grease
application lasts 18 months, after which
disassembly, cleaning, and re-greasing is
required, a time-consuming and expensive
process. A long-term solution of the
problem is being pursued. The avenues
being examined include different, longer
lasting greases, and plating or coating of the
steel.
Despite numerous design detail changes to
the GGVM, there are still problems with
durability and failure of the valve seat and
other parts of the module mechanisms which
apparently defy solution. Preliminary
evaluation of a different valve module design
shows promise. This avenue should be
pursued actively.
Ref: Finding #13
Data taken during early flights of the Space
Shuttle showed that the pre-flight
calculations underestimated the ascent flight
loads on the Orbiter. It was necessary to
devise a system of arbitrary wing panel loads
(so-called "collector" loads) to adjust
calculated external loads so that they
produced internal loads like those derived
from flight measurements.
Subsequently, more strain gages and pressure
sensors were installed, and data were taken
over the time period between flights STS-28
and STS-50. The pressure data showed the
presence of local shocks, and the magnitudes
of the pressure data did not agree with those
from wind tunnel tests. The wind tunnel
data were adjusted to conform with those
measured in flight, and an adjusted pressure
distribution was developed. This adjusted
pressure distribution was then used to
predict the external loads during ascent.
After the data collection flights, wing strain
gage calibration tests were conducted so that
the flight strain data could be used to
determine the bending moments, and shear
and torsional loads in the wing box structure.
Unfortunately, the data from the wing strain
calibration tests did not satisfy the conditions
needed to use the conventional method for
ascertaining the bending moment, shear, and
torsional loads. Instead, an "independent
matrix" method was developed to enable
the calculation of the direct problem, that
is, the applied load/predicted section strain
problem as well as the indirect problem,
measured strain/predicted section load. This
matrix method was used to compare loads
obtained from flight test data with
analytically predicted loads.
The results from flight data showed that the
bending moment and shear was within five
percent of the predicted values, using the
adjusted wind tunnel data pressure
distributions to obtain external loads.
Torsion exceeded the predicted values by
eight to 15 percent, however.
Predicted ascent loads using the "collector
loads" technique envelop (are greater than)
those obtained using measured pressure and
strain data from flight. As the "collector
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loads" method [employing the Orbit-
er/Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)
air load data base] is currently used to
establish allowable flight conditions, the
practice is conservative.
It has apparently been decided not to use
additional strain calibration tests or
additional pressure instrumentation to obtain
data that could permit an expansion of
the current flight envelope. Data will be
taken, employing existing instrumentation
on OV-102, on flights STS-52, -55, and -58
to obtain further substantiation of the calcu-
lations of applied and internal loads. This
is especially important for loads on the tail
where torsion plays a more significant role.
Pressure distribution data will be revised,
however, to predict the airloads for the
"ASRB Cycle 2" certification analysis during
1993 and 1994.
Ref: Findings #14 and #15
There are sufficient engines, spare engines,
and spare parts on hand to allow careful
inspections and tests when preparing engines
for flight. There are still limitations on the
service life of the High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump (HPFTP) and severe limitations
on the service life of the High Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP). The
engines have performed well in flight. With
diligent and scrupulous performance of all
the precautionary tests and inspections,
flights can continue at an acceptable level
of risk.
To increase the ruggedness of the highly
critical Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
and reduce its dependency on complex
checkout procedures, a number of design
modifications have been proposed or are
in various stages of development. It is
prudent to seek robust design solutions as
a replacement for extensive reliance on
personnel and procedures. When certified
and installed in the fleet, these improve-
ments will increase the operating margins
of the SSME and thereby provide better risk
management. The modifications include:
a single-tube heat exchanger, a new HPOTP
and HPFTP, a Large Throat Main
Combustion Chamber (LTMCC), and a two-
duct powerhead.
The two-duct powerhead and the single-tube
heat exchanger went into the certification
test program late in 1992 in an engine using
a standard throat diameter main combustion
chamber and the existing turbopumps.
The Alternate Turbopump Program (ATP)
involves both the HPOTP and the HPFTP.
The HPOTP has been placed into test and
originally experienced a shaft dynamics
problem. This has apparently been solved.
The HPOTP still has a problem of
premature pump-end bearing wear, but
solutions are being tested. The HPOTP
certification program is planned to begin
in the spring or early summer of 1993.
As noted in last year's report, the
development of the HPFFP had been placed
on hold because of budgetary problems.
It was possible, however, to install on one
turbopump all but one of the design
modifications needed to overcome the
problems the HPFTP had experienced
before work was stopped. This unit was
subjected to three test runs on the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) Technology
Test Bed facility with excellent results. If
the HPFI'P program is reactivated, it would
essentially be ready to enter certification
testing as soon as the final turbine vane
casting is produced.
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The LTMCC is now a formal part of the
SSME improvement program. However,
the Congressional appropriations committees
have recently denied funding for the
LTMCC. The test results obtained to date,
as reported last year, indicate that there is
no loss and, perhaps, a slight gain of specific
impulse (Isp), and that there is no evidence
of combustion instability. In fact, the
recovery time of the LTMCC is almost
identical with that of the existing small throat
Main Combustion Chamber (MCC). Use
of the LTMCC provides significant increases
in the operating margins of most of the
SSME components, especially the high
pressure turbopumps.
Unfortunately, the certification programs
for these improvements are spread out over
a 5-year period. Each of the components
was treated as a separate development entity.
As a result, certifications are being
performed in engine configurations that,
most probably, will never fly. For example,
as noted above, the two-duct powerhead and
single-tube heat exchanger are being certified
with the small throat MCC. Devising an
integrated modifications and certification
program encompassing all the changes noted
and aimed at producing a block upgrade of
the engine would provide not only more
realistic testing, but also potentially more
efficient and effective use of resources.
Ref: Finding #16
Performance of the RSRM has been
repeatable and predictable. Thrust-time
profiles of the more than 20 RSRM flights
have all met specification limits. The rate
of in-flight anomalies across 13 or more
flights has been stabilized at 2 or fewer per
flight. Appropriate corrective action has been
taken in each instance.
Improvements in plant-wide cleanliness and
the efficiency of RSRM manufacturing
procedures are clearly evident. NASA and
Thiokol have invested in facilities and
processes that have reduced cost and
increased product quality. Manufacturing
has been organized into work centers with
management, engineering, safety, quality
assurance, and material co-located and
assigned to supporting functions.
Flight Support Motors (FSMs) manufactured
to the current RSRM configuration have
proved their benefit to the program. The
FSMs have allowed the program to confirm
and validate process quality control, changes
in materials and manufacturing procedures,
and improvement in design. In response
to the drive for cost reductions, however,
it has been proposed to eliminate some or
all of the FSMs for the RSRM program.
The purported rationale for this proposed
action is that the program is "mature" and
no longer requires the degree of testing
represented by a FSM.
The significant safety benefits of the
continued use of FSMs in the RSRM
program argues against the elimination of
this type of testing. On the contrary, the
need to introduce material and process
changes and to qualify new suppliers as
sources are lost, suggest that NASA should
actively support the FSM program during
the remaining production of the RSRM.
In addition, the mandated elimination of
toxic/hazardous chemicals, and, especially,
the use of non-asbestos materials will require
FSM testing to ensure safety. The FSM
program is a prudent investment to maintain
and provides confirmation for the changes
that are deemed necessary.
Ref" Finding #17
There have been four instances of soot being
found on the O-ring (gas paths) of nozzle
joint numbers 1, 3, 4, and 5 during postflight
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examinationsof 42RSRMs. Thirty-five such
gas paths were noted during the same
inspections for nozzle joint number 2. All
cases revealed no heat effects or blowby at
primary seals. However, the relatively high
rate of undesirable gas flow for joint number
2 has prompted the program to seek
countermeasures. A new assembly sequence
with Room Temperature Vulcanizer (RTV)
backfill has been developed and is expected
to reduce the problem incidence. However,
this is a procedural solution to a problem
that occurs often enough to suggest the need
for a redesign.
Ref: Finding #18
Tests of the Structural Test Article 2
(STA-2) of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB)
aft skirt under the loads imposed by the
original Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
demonstrated that a weld failed at a factor
of safety (FOS) of 1.28 rather than the
required FOS of 1.40. As a result, waivers
are being processed for each flight to permit
the use of skirts with the 1.28 factor of
safety. The Space Shuttle Program has
approved a development effort for an aft
skirt modification consisting of the addition
of an external bracket with the object of
restoring a factor of safety of 1.40.
United States Boosters, Incorporated (USBI)
conducted a finite element analysis (FEA)
with a detailed submodel of the affected
weld area on the aft skirt with the added
external bracket. This bracket is intended
to increase the moment of inertia of the
cross-section and thereby reduce the stress
due to bending. The analysis predicted a
reduction in the strain at the outer surface
of the weld of 35 percent at the aft edge and
69 percent at the aft ring centerline. This
results in apredicted FOS in excess of 1.40.
It should be noted, however, that when the
original aft ring was redesigned, the moment
of inertia was calculated to be increased by
28 percent. A non-linear FEA showed a
stress reduction in the weld of 14 percent,
thus predicting a FOS greater than 1.40.
Nevertheless, the STA-3 full scale test failed
at 1.28 FOS. The added material to the ring,
therefore, was not effective. Based on this
experience, the use of the FEA global rigid
beam model displacements to determine the
boundary conditions for the external bracket
test specimen must be questioned.
The latest NASTRAN non-linear analysis
with an increased number of grid points and
elements in the critical area shows the
stresses to be maximum at the aft end of
the skin and lower toward the centerline of
the aft ring. The strain gage data from
actual launches and the SRB aft skirt
influence tests show just the opposite. The
maximum stress occurs in the skin at the
centerline of the aft ring and decreases
toward the aft edge of the skin. In fact, the
actual STA-3 test failure initiated 5 inches
above the aft edge of the skin in the vicinity
of the aft frame horizontal tab at its
centerline.
In summary, the use of a segment of the aft
skirt to test the proposed external bracket
poses at least the following issues:
The test specimen is a curved rigid
beam, not a complete ring. This can
result in strains and boundary
conditions that cannot be properly
duplicated. The 11- inch width of the
test specimen may not be wide enough
to represent accurately the aft skirt
structure.
In the actual aft skirt ring construction,
the stresses in the welded area are due
to moments, internal axial, and in-plane
shear loads from each of the four
holddown posts. The curved beam
specimen test of the external bracket
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cannot produce the same strains as
those in the full ring.
The effects of the external bracket could
be better evaluated in the facility that was
originally used for the influence testing of
a full aft skirt. This would raise no
significant questions about boundary
conditions. The application of 200,000 lbs
axially and 100,000 lbs radially used during
the influence tests resulted in 20,000 to
27,000 psi stresses in the region of concern.
These are large enough for a valid
evaluation of the effects of the added
external bracket.
Ref: Finding #19
The use of plasma arc welds on a case the
size of the one for the Advanced Solid
Rocket Motor (ASRM) is new to the rocket
industry. As for all welds, residual stresses
will occur in the vicinity of the weld. A
design margin is provided in the ASRM for
this residual stress by increasing the weld
joint thickness to 1.25 times the membrane
thickness. A stress relief treatment will be
used to partially relieve these residual
stresses.
It is anticipated that a number of start and
stop areas including those from weld repairs
will be made on the ASRM case segments.
The residual stress peaks at the start and
stop areas are different from the rest of the
weld. The stress corrosion cracking (SCC)
tests conducted to date show that earlier-
than-expected failures have taken place in
the 50-percent yield stress (YS) range. An
SCC test program has been established to
check the material's SCC performance and
select the proper post weld heat treatment.
An even more thorough evaluation of the
SCC effect is required. Testing should
include transverse and longitudinal speci-
mens. The validity of the SCC tests will only
be known when carded out on full scale
(150-inch diameter) cylinders.
Ref: Finding #20
The ASRM Manufacturing Software System
is intended to keep track of everything from
complete component descriptions to the
manufacturing history of each product
produced, as well as overseeing the control
of manufacturing operations. All of the
components needed to meet the comprehen-
sive specifications of the ASRM Manufactur-
ing Software System are being purchased,
rather than developed. The work currently
under way is to integrate them. The
emphasis to date seems to have focused
more on the physical connections and data
flow rather than the functional interrelation-
ships.
A substantially standard NASA design and
change review board process for all software
developed has been adopted. The ASRM
Program has also adopted a standard design
methodology for software development. In
addition, they have wisely adopted a formal
technical review process that will be used
not only for internal software developments,
but also for vendor-developed software.
At the time of the Panel's examination, there
was no complete, overarching requirements
document for manufacturing software. The
original top-level ASRM requirements were
flexible enough that a detailed requirements
document on the manufacturing system was
not mandated.
The Program plans to make extensive use
of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software
in order to reduce substantially the amount
of software that NASA and its contractors
must write. However, this decision means
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that NASA hasno control over the level of
software quality assurance that the individual
vendors apply. They must, therefore, depend
upon evaluation of the vendor track record
and the development of their own
acceptance tests. The intent to perform
acceptance tests is included in the ASRM
Program, but little information on how these
tests will be generated was available.
Also, at the time of the Panel review, an
overall systems integration plan did not exist.
A 17-week Conference Room Pilot Project
had just been started that appeared to be
loosely directed toward an integration plan,
but was also focused heavily at the
component level. The project was addressing
issues such as how components work
together, what operator displays will look
like, and what changes are needed to the
COTS software. However, no one with
formal training in human factors was
involved in the design of the operator
displays and functions. Some of the COTS
product vendors do, however, have well-
tested systems for building operator
interfaces.
As there is no systems integration plan, there
is no system-level testing plan. Apparently,
ad hoe testing was scheduled to occur during
the Pathfinder Stage (scheduled for summer
1993). At that stage, all components were
to be interconnected and inert materials
produced. Pathfinder is intended to work
out the kinks in the physical interconnections
of the system. However, it may not be
capable of testing the functional interconnec-
tions of the system as a whole. These
considerations could become moot as the
Program is seriously considering the
cancellation of the Pathfinder. This raises
concern about how integration and system-
level testing will be performed.
Ref: Findings #21 - #23
The Space Shuttle processing activities at
the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) involve
extensive scrutiny of individual operations
by quality assurance (QA) personnel. This
is time-comuming and may not be necessary
in all cases. KSC has recently started a pilot
Structured Surveillance Program. This
program involves assigning an inspection
level commensurate with the risk to safety
or mission quality. It relies on the person
performing the work for the primary quality
control and uses contractor QA personnel
as a redundant inspection of quality when
risk warrants. Civil service QA personnel
only become involved as a second, redundant
inspection for those operations involving the
highest risk.
The Structured Surveillance Program has
the potential to improve greatly the
efficiency of Shuttle processing operations
by reducing the intrusiveness of QA
activities. It also can assign quality
responsibility to the most appropriate level.
The pilot program must, however, be
carefully evaluated to ensure that overall
safety is enhanced or maintained despite
the reduction in oversight inspections
inherent in the Structured Surveillance
approach.
Last year, the Panel commended the task
team approach KSC had begun. During the
current year, the use of task teams was
expanded significantly with continuing
positive results. Task teams are fast
becoming an integral part of Shuttle
turnaround processing. This bodes well
for future safety and productivity at KSC.
As with the Structured Surveillance
Program, however, the task team effort
31
needscontinual appropriate evaluation to
providefeedbackfor programimprovement.
Also, if the Structured Surveillance Program
proves successful, effort might profitably be
devoted to including its principles within the
task team effort.
A third high bay Orbiter Processing Facility
(OPF-3) was opened at KSC during the year.
The design of this OPF took into account
significant lessons learned from years of use
of the other two OPFs. As a result,
significant improvements were made in the
support equipment installed and in the level
and subjective quality of the ambient
lighting.
Industrial engineering and human factors
studies have generally shown that both safety
and productivity can be enhanced by
increased ambient light levels. The informal
observations of the Panel members when
touring OPF-3 as well as comments received
from workers in the facility suggested that
the lighting in the new building is far
superior to that found in the older high bays.
The difference in lighting across the facilities
raises the concern that adaptation problems
may arise for personnel who rotate among
them.
The Panel was briefed that a request to
upgrade the lighting in OPFs -1 and -2 to
the level of OPF-3 has been made and is
awaiting funding. Given the potential
benefits of the upgrade and the possible
problems inherent in operating functionally
equivalent facilities with wide disparities in
lighting levels, the upgrade should proceed
as soon as possible.
Ref: Findings #24 and #25
The NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot is a large
facility that has great potential for
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contributing to the logistics program. With
this facility close at hand, unit turnaround
times should be further reduced. However,
the problem of coordination of the flow of
line replaceable units needs to be improved.
Units are held up for considerable periods
of time awaiting failure analysis. The control
of failure analysis is by a different
organizational element (the Johnson Space
Center) than that controlling the logistics
flow (the Kennedy Space Center). The
Space Shuttle Program's logistics would be
significantly enhanced if line replaceable
units were analyzed for failure and repaired
with minimal time between removal of a
unit, its failure analysis, repair, and return
to inventory.
The Orbiter logistics and support activities
appear to be under good management
control, but certain measurement
parameters, such as shelf stock life rates,
loss of spare or repair capability, and
manufacturer's service agency repair and
turnaround times for some components are
showing slightly adverse trends. Conversely,
other parameters such as cannibalization
have shown outstandingly low rates. General
performance of the Shuttle logistics system
is excellent and the difficulties, where they
exist, are being diligently addressed and
corrected.
The Orbiter logistics and support system
together with the funding for its continuation
at an appropriate level has evolved very
successfully over the past 12 years.
Progressive movement has led to the present
efficient centralization of much of the
directly supporting activity at the launch site.
The system is still being fine-tuned by the
orderly transfer of remaining activity
components under the Logistics Management
Responsibility Transfer program, and it is
essential to continue this program to
completion.
C. AERONAUTICS
Ref: Finding #26
The establishment of a NASA Headquarters
Aircraft Management Office with a senior
incumbent reporting directly to an Associate
Administrator was an extremely positive step.
This, in parallel with the promulgation in
1992 of a well-designed and comprehensive
NASA Aviation Safety Officers Reference
Guide, satisfies two longstanding Panel
concerns. At the same time, continuation
of the outstanding and dedicated services
of the Intercenter Air Operations Panel as
an independent entity virtually assures an
effective NASA aviation safety effort.
Ref: Finding #27
NASA's aging aircraft inventory is a source
of concern. Many NASA aircraft are flying
a considerable number of hours and years
beyond their originally estimated service
lives. Many are also used for missions for
which they were not originally designed.
NASA aircraft operators and managers are
sensitive to the potential difficulties and
hazards attendant to flying aging aircraft and
take prudent measures to preclude unsafe
conditions. Inspections and tests appear to
be appropriate, and no instances of operating
unsafe equipment were uncovered.
Nevertheless, as budgets shrink and pressures
to continue to operate mount, there is a
human tendency to stretch the rules. At the
same time it is obvious that the costs of
maintaining older aircraft may outstrip the
cost of replacement. Attention to the details
of extending service lives and to the costs
of replacement is certainly warranted.
Ref: Finding #28
Since 1946 when the X-1 became the first
research airplane program conducted from
what was then known as the High Speed
Flight Research Station - now the Dryden
Flight Research Facility - NACA/NASA
has conducted numerous flight investigations
of experimental aircraft in conjunction with
the Air Force and Navy with laudable
success. The cautious and painstaking
manner in which flight envelopes were
approached and negotiated by these aircraft
is a tribute to the efficiency and competence
of the engineering and flight crews involved.
Similar care and restraint in the conduct of
flight programs are evident at other
NACA/NASA installations such as the
Langley, Lewis, and Ames Research Centers.
In every Center, joint ventures with the Air
Force, Navy, and the Army continue to be
models of interagency collaboration.
Program reviews of flight test activities were
held during a visit to Dryden Flight Research
Facility by the Panel. A wide variety of
flight tests and technology evaluations are
being conducted that utilize more than a
dozen flight vehicles. In general, these flight
test activities are for the purpose of
validating and verifying concepts that have
been developed by analysis and ground tests.
There are inherent risks associated with
these efforts that require constant attention
to safety considerations. The Panel
considers the flight phase of the overall
NASA aeronautical research program as
essential to maintaining and enhancing the
nation's position in aeronautics.
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By developing the appropriate control law
software for an MD-11 transport aircraft,
the Highly Integrated Digital Electronic
Control (HIDEC) program has produced
excellent results in defining the ability to
control an aircraft with only the propulsion
system. The F-15 Propulsion Controlled
Aircraft (PCA) software has been validated,
and flight tests are ready to be initiated that
will include the critical landing phase. Due
to obvious safety implications, the Panel will
be reviewing this program more closely in
the coming year.
The X-31 enhanced fighter maneuverability
No. 2 aircraft experienced a Flight Control
Computer (FCC) shutdown due to a data
transfer (software) anomaly that could not
be repeated during bench tests. The failure
was compounded by causing the hydrazine
Emergency Power Unit (EPU) to fire
erroneously. Further analysis identified the
problem as insufficient FCC computation
time for certain failures. This problem
clearly illustrates the value and need for
rigorous pre-flight test evaluations and the
problems inherent in software verification
and validation.
The X-29 vortex flow control flight tests have
demonstrated for the first time the ability
to control an aircraft at high angles of attack
(alpha) by use of controlled blowing over
the nose of the aircraft. The problem being
addressed is that at the high alpha the
vertical fin is masked by the fuselage and
becomes ineffective. The program was
completed without significant problems and
is a tribute to an excellent flight safety effort
by the NASA/industry team.
The F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle
was committed to flight testing in September
1992 after a series of design reviews of the
Remotely Augmented Vehicle, all software
and the iron bird simulation. In addition
to the Thrust Vector Control System
interfaced with the engines, the aircraft has
been equipped with nose strakes for
enhanced roll control.
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D. OTHER
Ref: Finding #29
In discussions with the Panel, the
Administrator expressed concern about the
interface responsibilities between the NASA
Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission
Quality and its counterparts at the NASA
field Centers. Specifically, he asked the
Panel to ponder two issues: (1) whether the
Center safety and mission quality
organization should be "solid lined" (i.e.,
report programmaticaUy and administrative-
ly) to the Associate Administrator for Safety
and Mission Quality or continue to be
"dotted lined" (i.e., report only programmati-
cally) as is the current practice; and (2)
whether the performance evaluation of the
chief Center safety and mission quality
individual should be performed by the
Associate Administrator for Safety and
Mission Quality or continue to be carried
out by the Center Directors.
In addressing these issues, the views of
Center Directors, Associate Administrators,
and other key managers involved with or
affected by safety and mission quality
activities, both at the Centers and in
Headquarters, were solicited and recorded.
This information together with material
obtained in previous Panel examinations of
the safety and mission quality function
formed the basis for the findings and
recommendations in the report submitted
to the Administrator.
All the Center Directors and Program
Associate Administrators interviewed
endorsed the current relationships and
advocated their continuation, but with some
clarification where necessary. An anomaly
exists, for example, in the SSFP at Reston.
The safety and mission quality functions of
the Level II Reston office have been the
responsibility of a Level I safety and mission
quality individual at NASA Headquarters
- thus blurring the distinction between line
and staff functions.
During the review, it became apparent that
there were some misconceptions and
ambiguities defining the roles and
responsibilities of Center Directors and
Headquarter personnel in the management
of safety and mission quality functions. The
Panel suggests a clarification of their roles
through revised NASA Management
Instructions and a thorough communication
of their content throughout NASA.
Ref: Finding #30
The Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue
(SAFER) is a small maneuvering unit
intended to fit at the bottom of the Portable
Life Support System (PLSS) of an EVA
astronaut. Its main purpose would be to
permit the safe return of an astronaut who
becomes untethered from the Space Station
or an Orbiter that could not move quickly,
e.g., because it was attached to a satellite
or Space Station assembly package. The
probability of this problem arising is not
considered great for a free-flying Orbiter,
because it can maneuver immediately to
retrieve an astronaut who is drifting away.
However, Space Station assembly will involve
considerable EVA time with the Orbiter
essentially immobilized because of Space
Station components attached to the cargo
bay.
35
SAFER wasdevelopedin-houseat JSCby
the Automation and Robotics Division.
They plan to build an engineering prototype
and a flight unit for test on the Space
Shuttle. After this test, they will use the data
to develop detailed requirements.
As part of the SAFER program, a 3-degree
motion simulation has been prepared on an
air table. JSC has also developed an
excellent fixed-base, three-dimensional
computer graphics simulation that allows
astronauts to "fly" the SAFER with a full
6-degrees of motion. Finally, they have
adapted a 'Mrtual reality" system to give
potential crew members a realistic feeling
for the visual inputs they would obtain when
flying the SAFER. If the program proceeds,
Weightlessness Evaluation Test Facility
(WETF) testing is also planned.
SAFER is an excellent example of the type
of program that is essential to NASA's
success. The use of multiple types of
simulation (air table, fixed base, virtual
environment, WETF) is an extremely
effective way to proceed and should help
to avoid difficulties such as those
encountered in the Intelsat rescue.
Considering the potential safety (as well as
operational) benefits of SAFER, it should
be developed and tested as soon as possible.
Ref: Finding #31
Traditionally, three modes of simulator
training have been used to prepare crews
for space missions. These involve fixed base
simulators, moving based simulators and the
underwater test tank or WETF. The fixed
based simulators are excellent for learning
and practicing procedures that do not require
significant motion cue feedback. Moving
base simulators add vestibular cues to
enhance fidelity in those situations in which
a human derives significant information from
the motion response of the system. WETF
training uses neutral buoyancy to simulate
the effects of weightlessness.
Although these three types of training cover
much of the conditions an astronaut will
experience during EVA, they do not
adequately cover the dynamics of objects
that the astronaut must maneuver. This is
primarily because the water resistance in
the WETF prevents a response to force
inputs that realistically reflects the conditions
in zero-g.
Recent advances in virtual reality systems
make it possible to consider augmenting the
three basic types of simulators with a fourth
based on a virtual reality. Virtual reality
systems are typically implemented through
helmet-mounted video inputs to a user who
can then interact with the "virtual"
environment seen on the computer-generated
display. By using position sensors and
instrumented gloves, the trainee can actually
'_work" in the virtual environment which
could be programmed to simulate accurately
the motion of objects in zero-g.
The use of virtual reality for training is not
without some technical problems. Primary
among these is the fact that the ability to
reflect accurately the forces imposed on
objects and resulting from their motion is
somewhat limited. Nevertheless, the
technology has advanced enough and has
sufficiently high potential that it can be
productively used now. NASA is already
doing this with the SAFER system discussed
elsewhere in this report. The benefits of
virtual reality training for Shuttle EVA
activities and Space Station maintenance
and repair strongly suggest that NASA
should embark immediately on a research
and development program for utilizing
virtual reality in training.
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Ref: Finding #32
The Panel has urged NASA to include
greater consideration of human factors issues
within the Space Shuttle and Space Station
Programs for several years. In particular,
utilizing the preeminent human factors
capability within NASA's research centers
in support of the programs would appear
to hold a great potential for improving safety
by reducing the risk of accidents and
incidents due to human errors.
There has been an increase in efforts within
NASA to incorporate more human factors
expertise in prbgram operations in the past
year. However, they are not yet at a level
that can produce a maximum benefit. On
the contrary, several incidents during the
last year suggest the need for an immediate
increase in human factors oversight. These
include two problems with the Space Shuttle
Auxiliary Power Unit. The first involved
a latching relay in the Improved Auxiliary
Power Unit controller. The old controller
shut down the APU and closed the fuel
isolation valve when there was a problem.
In order to reset the APU and isolation
valve, the panel switch had to be changed
from the start/run position to the off
position and then back to the start/run
position. In the new controller, turning the
switch off reset the APU and opened the
fuel isolation valve. This led to the
possibility of the APU restarting after an
overspeed failure unless the crew executed
the added step of removing power from the
isolation valve.
The second problem involved a change in
the water deluge system for hot-starting the
APU. The new design forced the crew into
an unnatural and potentially dangerous set
of procedures that could have been avoided
by a properly human-engineered design.
The crew was forced to use a three-position,
center-off switch to control start/run, off,
and water cooling deluge. This could lead
to a high probability of errors under stressful
conditions, e.g., throwing the switch in the
wrong direction. This design was adopted
even though the sensors and valves already
existed to automate the water deluge as part
of a hot-start procedure to eliminate the
possibility of crew error.
Both APU problems were eventually
recognized, and workarounds were
developed. However, the fact that these
problems reached the point of a final design
implementation suggests that both the NASA
and contractor design, safety, and human
factors functions were not performing
adequately. The latching problem with the
controller should have been discovered
during the design process since it was a
baseline requirement. The hot-start process
was made a crew procedure on the
erroneous assumption that the crew does
not fail. In fact, a single-point hardware
failure with a known low probability of
occurrence was replaced with a crew
procedure with an unknown and highly
variable probability of occurrence.
On the positive side, the Space Station Work
Packages are allocating significant effort to
human factors issues within their purview.
For example, Work Package-2 (WP-2) is
doing a commendable job of designing the
crew interface for the habitat and laboratory
modules. They have assembled a multi-
disciplinary team that includes participation
from McDonnell Douglas human factors
experts. Unfortunately, there is no similar
team on the NASA side. Thus, the human
factors interface requirements are only
flowing upwards from Level IV.
The absence of a definitive crew interface
design agreement between NASA and the
international Space Station partners is
worrisome. It is not prudent to permit
interface differences among the various
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modules. It is definitely not sufficient to say
that, for example, that European crew
members will never work in the U.S. or
Japanese modules. There is apparently a
tentative agreement to standardize on the
backup caution and warning system
(EMADS) design being developed by WP-2.
However, the crew workstations and their
associated information input/output
requirements will likely not be standardized.
This leads to a higher than necessary
probability of human errors over a 30-year
operational life of the Space Station.
Ref: Finding #33
In addition to the in-house and work package
verification and validation performed,
independent verification and validation
(IV&V) is performed for the Space Station
by Draper Labs and the Space Station
Engineering Integration Contractor (SSEIC).
Some confusion has arisen over the detailed
nature of the verification and validation work
and whether these activities really are
independent of the principal development
contractor. As the IV&V question arises
frequently, NASA would be well served if
it had a clear statement of what is meant
by IV&V in the context of each of its
programs.
The terms verification and validation can be
used to denote a variety of related, but
different activities. There should be a clear
understanding of what is needed to assure
safety. For example, IV&V work could take
the form of repeating tests, independently
generating tests, or reviewing the processes
used by NASA (or its contractors) to develop
and perform verification and validation
testing. NASA's use of these terms should
be sufficiently standard that the definition
is accepted by the community at large. The
term independent also needs clarification.
No verification and validation are ever
completely independent. There is always
some level at which common reporting
occurs. This level needs to be clearly
identified and consistently applied across
the agency.
Ref: Finding #34
In October 1992, the Administrator stated
that NASA's infrastructure is critical to
meeting its mission goals. The Panel agrees
with this, but submits that the importance
of infrastructure goes far beyond meeting
NASA's mission goals. Indeed, NASA
infrastructure is a national asset, key to the
continuance of the United States' leadership
in space and aeronautics. Regrettably, some
of that infrastructure is not being adequately
maintained, and new, state-of-the-art
facilities are not being introduced at the rate
they are needed. Launch facilities,
laboratories, and NASA wind tunnels all fit
this description. Already, some American
aerospace companies are forced to use
foreign facilities. Not only does this impact
on intangibles such as prestige, but it can
affect the balance of payments, technological
leadership, and, at some point, safety.
NASA needs to exercise continuing
surveillance over its infrastructure and
implement timely maintenance modifications
and new facilities.
Ref: Finding #35
The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) consists
of a fixed base pallet which includes a 12-
meter, extendable and retractable boom to
launch and dock the satellite at a safe
distance from the Orbiter. The system is
designed to fly the satellite up to 62 km,
either above or below the Orbiter while
connected to a boom by a 2.5-mm-diameter
conductive tether. The satellite is equipped
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with reaction thrusters to provide in-line,
out-of-plane, and yaw control. The in-line
thrusters provide positive tension on the
tether in a situation where the tether slacks.
This could happen if the reel should jam
and may result in the loss of satellite attitude
stability, and a potential impact with or
entanglement of the Orbiter.
The first TSS mission that flew on STS-46
was programmed to deploy the satellite to
20 km above the Orbiter to verify control,
operation and the retrieval characteristics
of the system. Limited scientific investi-
gations were to be conducted in the general
areas of tether dynamics, spacecraft environ-
ment, and space plasma effects of electrical
power generation by the conductive tether.
Several problems that occurred during the
attempted deployment of the satellite
included: (1) a stuck power and data
umbilical, (2) binding of the upper tether
control mechanism, and (3) interference of
a bolt with the level wind mechanism. As
a result, the satellite initially failed to deploy,
then stopped at 179 meters, at which point
manual control was used to maximize the
satellite momentum to continue deployment.
It stopped again at 256 meters. When it was
reeled back to 224 meters, it failed to move
in either direction and was retrieved after
clearing of the jam by partial retraction of
the boom. As a result of these problems,
no further deployments were attempted.
The principal cause of the deployment
problem was that a bolt used to attach a
modification to the tether structure extended
into the path of the level wind arm and
jammed the reel assembly. This modification
was to relieve additional stresses due to
higher design loads, which were only
identified close to the time of launch. The
modification was judged to have no effect
on the operation of the reel assembly. As
a result, the installation was conducted in
the field without proper systems analysis or
verification, and the interference problem
of the bolt with the reel mechanism went
undetected. The lesson to be learned is
there is no substitute for good engineering
design and judgment, review, and, when
possible, rigorous testing of the total system.
Ref: Finding #36
NASA has embraced Total Quality
Management (TQM). Because TQM has
such potential for not only better leadership
and management but also for safer
operations, the Panel has taken an interest
in its implementation within NASA. The
impression from the reviews the Panel
received is that acceptance and understand-
ing of TQM is mixed, at best. Several of
the major NASA contractors have truly
outstanding programs, enthusiastically re-
ceived by all employees. Within NASA it-
self, however, the program appears to be
focusing mainly on the TQM process rather
than on achieving meaningful change. The
Panel has little hands-on TQM experience
itself, but is concerned that unless the NASA
program gets moving soon, it may result in
no more than a diversion of scarce resources
from other efforts. There are a number of
appropriate statements from top manage-
ment extant, and there are '"I'QM Managers"
who can deliver enthusiastic motivational
speeches. Nevertheless, the TQM imple-
mentations within NASA facilities appear
to be lagging those in place at contractor
facilities.
Ref: Finding #37
During the next several decades, our nation
- perhaps with others - will embark on
extended duration human exploration in
space. Such an endeavor requires the ability
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to maintain crew health and performance
in spacecraft, during extravehicular activities,
on planetary surfaces, and upon return to
earth. This goal can be achieved only
through focused research and technological
developments. The Aerospace Medicine
Advisory Committee (AMAC) report
entitled, "Strategic Considerations for
Support of Humans in Space and
Moon/Mars Exploration Missions (Life
Sciences Research and Technology Programs,
Volume 1)," provides the basis for setting
research priorities and making decisions to
enable extended duration human exploration
missions.
The AMAC report expands the recommen-
dations of several previous advisory
committees. It is based on the results of
comprehensive studies conducted by Life
Sciences Discipline Working Groups
(DWGs). These DWGs - 12 in number -
are listed here to show the scope and extent
of the AMAC undertaking:
Behavior, Performance, and Human
Factors
Regulatory Physiology
• Cardiopulmonary
• Environmental Health
• Musculoskeletal
• Neuroscience
• Radiation Health
• Cell and Developmental Biology
• Plant Biology
• Life Support
• Planetary Protection
• Exobiology.
The DWGs, in conjunction with NASA,
attempted to define the unresolved issues
considered critical to the advancement of
knowledge in their disciplines.
The AMAC concluded that, within the
current confines of knowledge, no issue
precludes human exploration of the Moon
and Mars if appropriate research is
conducted and enabling technologies are
developed. However, experimentation in
space, AMAC cautions, may disclose
unexpected difficulties that will require
reassessment of this conclusion.
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APPENDIX B
NASA RESPONSE TO MARCH 1992 ANNUAL REPORT
SUMMARY
In accordance with the Panel's letter of transmittal, NASA responded on
October 20, 1992 to the "Findings and Recommendations" from the March 1992 Annual
Report. This response was considerably delayed compared to previous years. As a
result, some of NASA's responses were no longer relevant due to programmatic changes
or the completion of the event at issue.
NASA's response to each report item was categorized by the Panel as "open," "continu-
ing," or "closed." Open items are those on which the Panel differs with the NASA
response in one or more respects. Continuing items involve concerns that are an
inherent part of NASA operations or have not progressed sufficiently to permit a final
determination by the Panel. These will remain a focus of the Panel's activities during
the next year. Items considered answered adequately are deemed closed.
Based on the Panel's review of the NASA response and the information gathered during
the 1992 period, the Panel considers that the following is the status of the
recommendations made in the 1992 Report:
NUMBER
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
RECOMMENDATION
SUBJECT [ STATUS
Space Station Freedom (SSF) safety and risk consid-
erations
SSF systems engineering and integration
SSF assured return capability
Use of preintegrated truss sections for SSF
SSF Data Management System software
Orbiter body flap
Shuttle Modal Inspection System
Orbiter thermal protection system inspectors
Orbiter maintenance
Orbiter Autoland System
Software independent verification and validation
Space Shuttle general purpose computer system
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
OPEN
CONTINUING
OPEN
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NUMBER
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
RECOMMENDATION
SUBJECT
Automation of Space Shuttle crew procedures
Number of flightworthy Space Shuttle Main Engines
(SSME)
SSME component reliability and safety improve-
ment program
Large throat main combustion chamber and SSME
Advanced Fabrication Process
Alternate HPFTP development restoration
ASRM O-ring material
ASRM propellant manufacturing plant scale-up
ASRM propellant manufacturing plant operator
interface
ASRM case development test program
Aft skirt loads/strains monitoring
ASRM logistics
Orbiter landing performance analysis
Launch processing
Launch processing personnel morale
Operations and Maintenance Instructions quality
improvement
Use of task teams at KSC
Corrective action for KSC hardware problems
Shuttle Processing Data Management System II
Orbiter logistics and support program
Integrated Logistics Panel
Logistics Management Responsibility Transfer Pro-
gram
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot support
Orbiter parts cannibalization
Repair turnaround time control
STATUS
CON TINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
OPEN
OPEN
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
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NUMBER
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
RECOMMENDATION
SUBJECT
Stocking recovery program establishment
Management of replacement/substitute parts levels
Incorporation of aviation safety in the Basic Safety
Manual (now called the Safety Policy and Require-
ments Document) (NHB 1700.1)
Aeronautical flight research program safety
Space Shuttle crew circadian rhythm problems
Space flight risk assessment and accident avoidance
involving human factors
Human-error reporting
Tethered Satellite System quality assurance program
Development of a new space suit and extravehicular
mobility unit
Extravehicular activity bends risk
STATUS
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
OPEN
OPEN
OPEN
CONTINUING
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NASA
National Aeronautics and
S0ace Adm,ntstration
Washington, D C
20546
Office of the Administrator
Mr. Norman R. Parmet
chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
5907 Sunrise Drive
Fairway, KS 66205
OCT 2 0 1992
Dear Mr. Parmet:
In accordance with your introductory letter to the
March 1992 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual Report,
enclosed is NASA's detailed response to Section II, "Findings
and Recommendations."
The ASAP's commitment to assist NASA in maintaining the
highest possible safety standards is commendable. Your
recommendations play an important role in risk reduction in NASA
programs and are greatly appreciated.
We thank you and your Panel members for your valuable
contributions. ASAP recommendations are highly regarded and
receive the full attention of NASA senior management. We look
forward to working with you.
sincerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
Enclosure
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1992 AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL REPORT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
During the past 1_ years, Space Station Freedom (SSF) has undergone a
reconfiguration involving many technical changes and program deferrals. These changes
were highlighted in the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's (ASAP's) March 1991 report.
Some of the changes affect risk and safety while others influence serviceability and
usefulness. Nevertheless, the SSF design that has emerged is more realistic and capable
of supporting a stable development program.
Recommautation _1: Safety and risk considerations should remain of paramount
importance in the development of the reconfigured Space Station.
NASA Response: Concur. Safety and risk considerations are central to successful
development and operations.
The ASAP March 1991 Annual Report characterized the Space Station
Freedom Program (SSFP) as plagued with technical and managerial difficulties and
lacking an effective systems engineering and integration organization. Significant
developments have occurred in the ensuing year. In particular, there has been a
clarification of system engineering and systems integration responsibilities among NASA
Headquarters and the Centers. Also, key managerial assignments have been delegated
to appropriate Centers. The new arrangement benefits the program by drawing on the
substantial technical expertise of the Centers' staff members not specifically assigned to
the SSFP.
Reconvnendation #2: The changes introduced in the systems engineering and integration
management areas should be monitored to ensure that the new arrangement is effective
and that maximum use is made of each Center's particular capabilities.
NASA R_eapons¢: Concur. The clarification of systems engineering and systems
integration has resulted in a well-structured engineering organization across the SSFP.
The changes introduced will continue to be monitored by the Space Station Freedom
Program Office (SSFPO) for effectiveness and efficient use of each Center's capabilities.
F_//Id/eg/_: NASA's current policy is not to leave a crew on the Space Station without
an attached Space Shuttle or other assured return capability. At present, there is no
program to develop a dedicated assured return vehicle. However, using an Orbiter as an
assured return vehicle on long-duration missions reduces the number of Space Shuttles
available for other purposes and raises potential safety and reliability issues.
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Recommendation #3_ NASA should continue studies to explore various options for
assuring a safe return capability from SSF leading to the selection of a preferred option
in a timely manner.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA is continuing to consider alternatives for ensuring safe
return of the SSF crew. Current program requirements are that an assured crew return
capability is a prerequisite for the Permanent Manned Capability (PMC) phase.
Hardware development should also follow a schedule to support the PMC phase.
However, funding to support the full development of this capability is not presently
budgeted, and approval to start has not yet been granted by Congress.
Eitrd/trg_ Use of preintegrated truss (PIT) sections for SSF greatly simplifies on-orbit
assembly. However, the capture latch, guide pins, and motorized bolts used to couple
the assemblies may not always be in proper alignment. This could lead to damaging the
guide pins or bolts thereby precluding mating.
Recommendation #4: The PIT development program should consider actual hardware
tests to verify the assembly process to be used in orbit. These tests should encompass
the full range of misalignments, tolerances, and impacts that might reasonably be
expected to occur when the truss is assembled with the actual equipment and procedures
to be used.
NASA Response." Concur. Failure Modes and Effects/Hazard Analyses have identified
areas of potential risk during assembly. The assembly procedure and hardware will
include a cone and feeding guide that provide tolerance for eccentricity in the mating
process. The integration contractor is developing programs and test plans for the
motorized bolts to check for misalignments that might preclude mating. Assembly
process and hardware quality tests are being generated to preclude any obstacles to a
successful assembly.
Software for the Data Management System (DMS) represents one of the
major challenges to meeting the intensive delta design review (DDR) schedule.
• Recormnendation #5: The DMS software development process should be monitored
closely to ensure it is compatible with the existing DDR schedules.
NASA Response." Concur. DMS software development will be monitored closely to
ensure that the software is at a satisfactory stage for the DDR.
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B. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
The results of flight tests indicate that the turbulent flow over the body flap
creates a spectrum of hinge moments greater than that used in the original structural
fatigue analysis. It also has been determined that an additional load path exists from the
flap to the supporting structure. Further, the flap actuators were found to be more
flexible than originally assumed. Additional tests are to be conducted to evaluate hinge
moments and actuator flexibility.
Reconmumdation #6" NASA should evaluate, as rapidly as possible, the results of the
new tests and loads analyses to reestablish the allowable number of flights for the body
flap.
NASA _nse: Concur. The Space Shuttle Program has baselined a set of loads to
account for the increased buffet environment. Additionally, the Space Shuttle Program
has implemented a plan to measure loads during missions. Assessments have shown
adequate mission life of the body flap for current missions and overall life still is being
evaluated. Additionally, the Shuttle Modal Inspection System (SMIS) is being used to
track potential damage of the body flap.
F__kld/tlg.#_ NASA has developed a Shuttle Modal Inspection System (SMIS) for
detecting changes in stiffness in structural/mechanical systems due to factors such as
wear or cracking. The SMIS has shown good results when used on the Orbiter body flap
and elevon systems (including actuators and supporting structures). However, it is not a
complete replacement for more conventional nondestructive inspection (NDI) methods.
These conventional methods are capable of detecting cracks in primary structures with a
"critical crack length" too small to cause a detectable change in stiffness and hence be
measurable by SMIS.
Reconmumdation #7." The SMIS procedure should be used only to augment more
conventional NDI methods.
NASA Re,spo_ns¢: Concur. Successful tests have indicated that the SMIS is a reliable
method to detect changes in stiffness and dynamic behavior of the Orbiter body flap,
elevon, and rotor speed brake (control surfaces). The SMIS is not intended to replace
current inspection procedures but is to supplement standard inspection procedures to
help detect early damage in areas that cannot be inspected. NASA has not deleted any
structural inspection requirements documented in the Operational Maintenance
Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD).
B-7
E//ld/tig..._ Thermal protection system tiles are inspected for damage after every flight
by specially trained and highly experienced inspectors using tactile techniques. These
inspectors determine if the tiles are loose and help to identify problems in step and gap.
The current procedure is largely qualitative and highly dependent on the skill of the
individual inspectors.
Recommotdation #8.- A program to select and train new inspectors should be instituted
to ensure the availability of an adequate cadre of qualified inspectors throughout the life
of the Orbiters. In addition, further effort should be applied to the development of a
quantitative inspection technique.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA has a program in place to train and qualify inspectors
to inspect TPS tiles. In addition, quantitative techniques are being investigated to reduce
the technique-sensitive characteristics of the current, operator-dependent, inspection
techniques.
Currently, all new tile inspections require bond verification testing. Any postflight tile
suspect bond conditions also are verified along with conducting engineering "deflection"
tests. A dozen certified bond inspectors presently are being used to qualitatively
evaluate suspect tile bonds. The individuals have been trained on-the-job and consist of
contractor and government engineers. The number of trained personnel will remain the
same unless unforeseen increases in bond anomalies occur.
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is actively pursuing the development and
implementation of an alternative nondestructive evaluation (NDE) method for
performing tile bond verification. Presently, a math model of the tile system is being
formulated that will be used to evaluate the abilities of NDE systems being developed by
two independent contractors. These NDE systems use vibration imaging patterns
correlated to bond discrepancies to identify bond anomalies.
E/tld/tlg.._lL_ The Space Shuttle Program requires both turnaround and periodic major
Orbiter overhaul functions.
Recommendation #9: Overhaul and major modification efforts should be
organizationally and functionally separated from routine turnaround operations because
of the different types of planning and management skills and experience required.
NASA Response: The Space Shuttle Program has dedicated Orbiter Maintenance Down
Periods (OMDP) at 3-year intervals for the performance of major modifications,
structural inspections and other interval inspections. The decision to retain the same
organizational structure at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for planning and
management of both OMDPs as well as turnaround processing is based on the following:
From a fiscal standpoint, separate organizations are not an affordable option.
OMDPs for the fleet of four Orbiters on 3-year intervals do not provide the
steady workload to justify a separate organization to manage OMDPs.
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Use of dedicated processingteamsfor each Orbiter vehicle has resulted in
significant "corporate memory"within each vehicle team and a demonstrated
capability to accomplishmajor Orbiter modifications and interval inspections.
Theseprocessingteams include both NASA and the SpaceShuttle processing
contractor, aswell as SpaceShuttle element launch support service contractors.
Where applicable, Orbiter contractor and vendor teams are utilized for OMDP
tasks that require their special skills.
Because processing management teams are dedicated to each Orbiter, the
management of the OMDP presents no impact to the management of normal
turnaround processing.
The Space Shuttle design presently includes an automatic approach
guidance system that requires crew participation and does not control all landing
functions through touchdown and rollout to wheel stop. The present system never has
been flight tested to touchdown, but a detailed test objective for such a test is in
preparation. The availability of a certified automatic landing system would provide risk
reduction benefits in situations such as weather problems after de-orbit and Orbiter
windshield damage.
Recommendation #10: Future mission plans suggest the potential for significant risk
reduction if the present Space Shuttle automatic landing capabilities are fully developed
and certified for operational use. System development should include consideration of
hardware, software, and human factors issues.
NASA Response: The current autoland system capability is functionally adequate and
verified as a backup entry system with some crew participation required. Beginning with
STS-53, a two-flight detailed test objective will evaluate autolanding performance
through wheel stop. Further, a program study is under way to define the necessary
hardware, software, human factors, and system analyses required to support an upgraded
autoland system for extended duration Space Shuttle flights where this autoland system
could be the prime mode for entry operations.
NASA continued its software independent verification and validation
(IV&V) activities during the year. This independent review has demonstrated its value
by finding failure modes that previously were unknown. The Safety and Mission Quality
organization has taken on greater responsibilities for software safety.
Recommendation #11: NASA should continue to support a software IV&V oversight
activity. The present process should be reviewed to ascertain whether it can be
streamlined. The IV&V oversight activity should include the development of detailed
procedures for test generation. NASA should not attempt to duplicate, through IV&V
or otherwise, the actual performance of all verification and validation tests.
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NASA Response: Concur. The Space Shuttle Program has formally baselined the
embedded V&V process and established the requirements in NSTS 08271, Flight
Software Verification and Validation Requirements; formally established a V&V policy
requiring program elements to adhere to this process; and assigned the SR&QA
organization as the independent overseer assuring adherence to this process. The Space
Shuttle V&V process includes maintenance of detailed test procedures on many levels
for the existing test facilities available to the program. Although the program feels very
stronglythat the embedded V&V process is excellent, the NRC has been requested to
evaluate the Space Shuttle's embedded V&V process relative to the need for IV&V.
NRC's evaluation is in process with planned completion targeted for September 1992.
Additionally, NASA plans construction of an IV&V facility in Fairmont, WV in 1992.
Methods of improving and streamlining the IV&V process will be studied at this facility.
Based on criticality and category of the software to be independently validated and
verified, the NASA IV&V activity will permit tailoring to specific software project needs.
It is not the intent of these independent activities to duplicate all verification and
validation (V&V) tests, but to provide support and consistency to enhance the V&V
process.
E/tlddtlgJL/.,_ The new Space Shuttle general purpose computer (GPC) apparently has
performed well. The Single Event Upsets (SEUs) were no more numerous than
expected. Based upon NASA's model of SEUs, the accuracy of the predictions is
excellent, and supports NASA's estimate that the probability of an SEU-induced failure
is negligibly small. Nevertheless, there still is concern about the eventual saturation of
usable memory on the GPC.
Recommoutation #12: NASA should initiate a small study on alternatives for future
GPC upgrades and/or replacements. This should involve other NASA organizations that
have been studying computer evolution.
NASA Response: The GPC Error Detection and Correction circuitry cyclically accesses
each word in the 256K memory every 1.7 seconds. Because any SEU error is corrected
at that rate, there is minimal chance of the memory being "saturated," regardless of the
duration of exposure. The same circuitry also generates a count whenever it encounters
and corrects such an error, thereby providing corroborating data to compare with the
environmental analyses performed to predict SEU rates. The same EDAC architecture
is used in the Space Station onboard 386 processors. That processor family also has
been selected for the new Space Shuttle Muififunction Electr0nic Display Syste-m ....
(MEDS). It is anticipated that the MEDS will allow future mission-related software
growth without directly impacting the flight-critical code in the GPCs. Available usable
memory in the GPC appears to be adequate well into the next decade. It is probable
that hardware obsolescence will arrive well before practical memory limits are reached.
Considerations for GPC upgrades should be initiated in the next 3 to 4 years through the
Assured Shuttle Availability (ASA) process.
L
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The replacement of some requested software upgrades with crew
procedures is a matter of serious concern particularly when the functions addressed could
be handled with greater reliabiliiy and safety by software. The crew already has to cope
with a very large number of procedures.
Recommautation #1,_." NASA should conduct a thorough review of all crew procedures
that might be performed by the computer system to determine whether they are better
done manually by the crew or by the software. Human factors specialists and astronauts
should participate.
NASA Response: Concur. As part of the software upgrade process, reviews are held to
determine which activities are best shifted from the crew procedures. Astronauts have
actively participate in these processes and reviews. Human factors specialists also
contribute to this process.
The Space Shuttle Program has and will continue to implement flight software
automation of crew procedures that are deemed a significant threat to flight safety or
mission success due to the level of difficulty. Tasks for which manual procedures are
adequate are judged based on the trade-off of value added/implementation risk against
other flight software priorities. During the requirements baselining of the last three
Operational Increments (i.e., O1-21, -22, -23), a significant number of software change
requests were approved that automated existing crew procedures. Examples include
(1) single engine auto contingency abort, which defined the automation of vehicle
maneuvers following the failure of two Space Shuttle Main Engines; (2) abort sequencing
redesign, which automated some of the crew procedure for aborts; (3) Transatlantic
Abort Landing (TAL) droop control, which automated crew procedures to keep the
vehicle above a minimum target altitude; and (4) Universal Pointing Future Maneuver-
Digital Autopilot (DAP) that significantly reduces the crew procedures for selecting the
most appropriate DAP configuration to enter from 14 separate entries to a single entry.
There are currently a sufficient number of flightworthy engines to provide
each Orbiter with a flight set as well as provide an adequate number of spares.
Recommendation #14" Maintain this position.
NASA Response: Thank you. We intend to maintain a good posture on spare engines.
The SSME component reliability and safety improvement program,
designed to enhance or sustain the current component operating margins, has made
progress towards achieving its objectives. The high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP)
has completed its certification. Changes to the two-duct powerhead have eliminated
injector erosion, but more work is needed to reduce main combustion chamber (MCC)
wall damage. The process for producing the single-tube heat exchanger has been
B-11
developed, and heat exchangers are being installed for testing. The high-pressure oxygen
turbopump (HPOTP) changes were less successful in meeting service-life objectives, but
an operational workaround to reduce turnaround time for the HPOTP has been
implemented.
Recommendation #15: Continue the development of these reliability and safety
improvements. Complete their certification as expeditiously as possible.
NASA _z-po_ nse Concur. As noted, we are continuing to make progress in the Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) component reliability and safety program. The main
combustion chamber (MCC) wall damage incurred by the two-duct powerhead has been
arrested through a combination of hardware and operational changes. A new procedure
has been developed for assuring proper liquid oxygen (LOX) post-biasing and a change
has been incorporated to the coolant control valve sequence. Also, as noted, the single-
tube heat exchanger testing is on scheduled. NASA plans to continue to pursue these
activities vigorously within funding constraints.
E/tldit!g.z_ The development of the large throat main combustion chamber (LTMCC)
and Advanced Fabrication Processes for the SSME have been discontinued. Both of
these efforts eventually would have led to significantly enhanced safety and reliability of
the SSME.
Recommendation #1_:_ Restore these important safety-related programs.
NASA Res_oonse." While LTMCC and enhanced fabrication of the SSME are desirable,
they have not been deemed to be essential to continued safe operations of the SSME.
Originally, LTMCC was proposed to accommodate sustained SSME operation at the
109 percent power level. The requirement for higher operating power levels than at
present has been deferred. The current SSME fabrication techniques and MCC design
continue to be safe and reliable for flight. The advantage of LTMCC operation at
higher rated power levels with regard to operating speed/pressure/temperature and
advanced fabrication with regard to manufacturing and inspection have not been shown
to justify the cost of these programs given current NASA budgetary constraints.
F_itla_ng_t_/_ The Alternate Turbopump Program has made major progress toward
achieving its objectives despite design problems uncovered during design verification
systems (DVS) and component development tests. Engine-level tests have begun for
both turbopumps. The value of heavily instrumented test items run on the E-8
component test stand has been demonstrated clearly, as evidenced by the rapid
identification of problem sources and the development of design changes to overcome i-
them. NASA has opted to delete the work on the alternate HPFTP and to continue only
the development on the alternate HPOTP with the intent to use it, when certified, in
conjunction with the current HPFTP. While such a configuration is feasible, such usage
will not achieve the increase of operating margins in the _ to the levels
desired and advocated by program and propulsion specialists.
=
=
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_Recommendation #17: Restore the alternate HPFTP development.
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NASA Response:" The VA-HUD-Independent Agencies FY 1992 Appropriations Act
reduced funding for development of the alternate turbopumps by $40 million, and the
conferees reported their belief that the fuel ATP should be terminated. The conferees
based this on the successful certification of improvements to the current fuel pumps and
on increased development costs.
The original contract for development of the fuel and liquid oxygen (LOX) ATPs was
signed in December 1986. The contract cost for development of both fuel and LOX
pumps was $198.2 million. Also, $50 million was provided for additional hardware and
analysis for a total of $248.2 million.
The original estimate for implementing the Pratt and Whitney pumps into the fleet was
essentially "no cost" because this expense would offset the replacement and
refurbishment expense that was already included in the budget for Rocketdyne.
1' " ,1
However, an after-the-fact-estimate for implementation of the alternate turbopumps
was calculated to be $160.3 million.
The sum of these estimates ($248.2 million and $160.3 million) is $408.5 million.
Assuming the expense of developing and implementing the fuel ATP is one half the
estimate, the result is an original cost estimate of $204.2 million. However, current
estimates for development and implementation of the fuel ATP are between $498
million and $560 million. This is a 144% to 174% increase over the last 5 years,
depending on which figure is used. There is no contract for implementation, therefore,
only rough estimates are available. It should also be noted that a significant amount of
cost growth was caused by schedule stretchouts and additional pump sets required as the
result of technical problems during development.
Since the enactment of the FY 1992 Appropriation Act, NASA has thoroughly reviewed
the high-pressure turbopump enhancement program. After careful consideration of a
myriad of safety, supportability, cost and budget factors, the Space Shuttle Program
recommended, with the Administrator's concurrence, that the alternate fuel turbopump
should be deferred -- not terminated -- in order to focus on development of the LOX
ATP. If the LOX ATP development is successful and the pump is certified for flight in
FY 1994 as planned, the development of the fuel ATP will be restarted that year. This
schedule slippage is estimated to increase development costs by $206 million and
implementation costs by $50 million or a total increase of $256 million for the fuel ATP.
In responding to the reduced funding, we are not abandoning the investment made in the
fuel ATP development program. We continue to believe that the fuel ATP will provide
increased flight safety margins and reduce maintenance requirements. However, in this
period of scarce resources, we are forced to focus our efforts on first successfully
completing development for the LOX ATP which is our most urgent priority. This
action follows our careful review of thestatus for the development, safety, and budget
consideration, as well as consultation with program management both in Washington and
at the MSFC, NASA's reliability and safety personnel, and with the responsible
contractor management.
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NASA previously has investigated the possibility of developing a new, low-
temperature elastomeric O-ring material to eliminate the need for the field joint heater
assembly on the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). None was found that was
compatible with the grease used during assembly. The material (GCT Viton) being
developed for the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) O-rings has proper elasticity
down to 33"F.
Recommendation #18: NASA should evaluate the ASRM O-ring material (GCT Viton)
for use on the RSRM to eliminate the field joint heaters and their installation.
NASA Res_Donse." Concur. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) currently is evaluating
the ASRM O-ring material, as well as several other candidate materials, for possible use
in the RSRM program to eliminate the field joint heaters and their installation. The
MSFC Material and Processes (M&P) Engineering seal team has samples of the
candidate materials and is performing a matrix of performance tests.
E//Id/t/g_iE/_ The full-scale ASRM propellant manufacturing facility may not be directly
scaleable from the continuous mix pilot plant. Particular problem areas relate to the
particle size of the propellant and the screw pump section of the rotofeed.
R_ommendation #19: Scale-up of the ASRM propellant manufacturing plant should be
scrutinized closely by NASA to ensure that safety and schedule are not compromised.
NASA Response." Concur. Scale-up of the continuous mix process is being scrutinized
closely by both NASA and the contractors. Issues that result from propellant runs at the
continuous mix pilot plant are highlighted for correction during a follow-on run. Each
issue and its resolution is viewed for its possible relevance in the full-scale facility.
Trending of the parameters in the continuous mix pilot plant is being performed to
assess data that will be beneficial in the scale-up. Propellant rheology studies of the
ASRM propellant formulation are being conducted. Schedules and specific test plans
will be prepared for facility checkout and activation. Particular emphasis will continue to
be placed upon safety-related issues.
An ambitious automated process is planned for the ASRM propellant
mixing and casting. This process will be largely computer-operated witlaq_uman
operators serving primarily as initiators and monitors. This will place significant
demands on the design of the operator interface of the system to ensure an effective and
safe allocation of tasks and responsibilities between humans and COmputers.'
Recommendatio_ The ASRM program should develop task and functional analyses
of the human operator's role in the solid rocket manufacturing process and the operator
interface with the computer system with emphasis on safety aspects.
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NASA _nse.- Concur. The human operators' roles in the solid rocket manufacturing
process will be clearly defined and documented. Emphasis will be placed on training,
the operator interface with the computer system, and the safety aspects of the
manufacturing process.
F_.//ld/tlg.._ Development of the ASRM case and its manufacturing processes includes
a number of new methods and materials. For example, a new steel case material with
associated plasma-arc welding and repair techniques and automated internal stripwinding
of the insulation are part of the design.
Recommautation #21: Due to the extensive use of new materials and processes in
ASRM case manufacturing, NASA should monitor the associated development test
program carefully to ensure that safety is not compromised.
NASA Response: Concur. A number of internal and external groups have reviewed the
contents of the ASRM Development and Verification (D&V) Plan including the
National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences and Engineering. Many of
the group's recommendations already are included in our planning and we have
incorporated recommendations as appropriate. NASA will be active participants and
monitor program execution as it proceeds through the various sub-scale and full-scale
test articles, development and qualification motors, and the pathfinder motor.
NASA has decided not to improve the current aft skirt design to meet the
original design specification of a factor of safety of 1.4. NASA now believes that a 1.28
factor of safety is adequate because the loads are well-defined.
Recommendation #2?- Due to the lower factor of safety on the current RSRM skirts
and the planned use of the same skirt on future ASRMs, NASA should task its safety
organization to monitor the loads/strains measured during launches to establish a truly
credible data base for the statistical justification of the lower factor of safety.
NASA Response: Concur. There is a waiver to the aft skirt factor of safety valid only for
the RSRM. However, the Space Shuttle Program recently approved a development
program for an aft skirt modification with the goal of restoring the factor of safety to 1.4.
This development program is scheduled so that it will support both RSRM and ASRM.
The current instrument that measures critical skirt strains during launch will remain in
place indefinitely to monitor the health of the hardware and establish an extensive
engineering data base. Data are reviewed on a flight-by-flight basis by engineering and
safety organizations.
Logistics development for the ASRM is being pursued. All related major
contractors and NASA groups are actively participating. Planning documents for support
equipment, training, and transporting the motor elements are being prepared.
Recommendation #23: Continue the early and thorough consideration of ASRM logisticsissues.
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/_ASA Response." Concur. Development of ASRM logistics will continue to include the
active participation of NASA and contractor personnel. Both NASA and contractor
personnel are members of the Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP). The ASRM Logistics
status is presented at each ILP quarterly meeting.
Several landing anomalies were experienced during the past year, including
an extremely short landing on STS-37. Careful examination of the causes of these
anomalies led to significant opei'ational improvements.
Recommendation #.24: A continuing analysis of landing performance should be
undertaken to include hardware, software, personnel functions, and information transfer.
Continued improvement in all areas related to landing safety, including use of wind data
and automatic guidance, should be sought as part of the movement to shift more
landings to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
NASA Re.s_oonse." Concur. While all Orbiter landings have been safe, NASA will
continue to focus on improving procedures and training to enhance landing margins.
The Space Shuttle Program and the operational elements are determining the necessity
of adding additional potential energy to the final flight phase. Two of the parameters
currently under evaluation are increasing the approach speed and the outer glide slope
angle. These systems are being flight tested in the Shuttle Training Aircraft (ST A) and
the vertical motion simulator. Improvements in real-time communications to the flight
crew of additional environmental and STA performance data has been implemented.
In spite of significant advances over the past year, there is still a need to
improve the effectiveness of launch processing at KSC. It is rare when a vehicle is taken
to the pad and launched without delays. Subsystem problems sometimes either require
rolling the vehicle back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) or they cause delays at
the pad.
l_eco_n #25: Continue efforts to improve the effectiveness of launch
processing operations. Each occurrence of a problem at the pad should be reviewed to
determine why it was not caught in the VAB or Orbiter Processing Facility.
Concur. NASA is committed to a series of new initiatives designed to
enhance the hands-on accountability of individuals at the task level and improve
processing flow. The Space Shuttle Program has requested all Space Shuttle projects to
continue striving for efficiencies in the checkout requirements and the implementing
procedures at KSC. The Space Shuttle Program recently completed a project-by-project
review of the OMRSD requirements. The goal was to eliminate or reduce '_,ehicle"
checkout requirements that were considered redundant testing or over-testing of a
system. This is now beginning to appear in the OMIs as efficiencies to operations. A
policy that has been put in place by the Space Shuttle Program defers testing of a
function until reaching the pad if (1) that function is required to be checked out in an
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integrated test and (2) the system/component can be reasonably repaired or
removed/replaced at the pad. Process reviews and process analyses by the task teams
still are being promoted as another technique to improve processing operations.
E//td//Ig2f2_ Morale among launch processing personnel at KSC improved over the past
ye.ar. This most likely is the result of a heightened sense of individual responsibility,
improved systems training, and a better supervisory/management approach.
Recommendation #20." Continue and expand the approaches that have been successful
over the past year.
NASA Response: Concur.
Operations and maintenance instructions (OMIs) have shown
improvement. However, recent over-pressurization of a solid rocket booster (SRB)
hydraulic tank has been attributed to an improperly written OMI. It also has been noted
that an apparent excess of signatures still is needed in the paperwork generation and
revision process.
Recommendaaon #27." Effort should be continued to improve the quality of OMIs.
This should include the generation, review, and revision of the instructions. Efforts also
should be made to reduce unnecessary signature requirements and consolidate
paperwork systems.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA is continually reviewing OMI processes and signature
requirements to improve content and consolidate paperwork systems and reduce
processing time. As part of the continuing effort to improve the quality of OMIs, a
Work Preparation Support System (WPSS) function is being implemented as part of the
Shuttle Processing Data Management System II (SPDMS II), which will automate both
the formatting and parts/materials listings of OMIs. This improvement will reduce the
time needed to prepare OMIs by automating portions of the documents that previously
were prepared manually. A program change also is being implemented to redefine
technical operating procedure signature responsibilities to further enhance processing
efficiency. Standard Practice Instructions (SPIs) for Space Shuttle processing are being
released, which reduce unnecessary signature requirements in accordance with the
approved program change. Memoranda of Understanding between the Space Shuttle
processing contractor and Space Shuttle element launch support services (LSS)
contractor organizations at KSC have been updated to reflect detailed implementation of
these improvements.
The use of task teams at KSC appears to be working well.
Recommendation #28" The task team approach should be expanded as planned.
addition, coordination among task teams should be improved.
In
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NASA Response." Concur. The task team approach to accomplish processing flow tasks
safely, correctly, and on schedule has been implemented utilizing a pilot program
approach within the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF). With the success of the OPF
operation fully recognized, other operations (solid rocket booster stacking, external tank,
and Orbiter mating) will implement the task team approach. One improvement
presently being assessed is the transfer of responsibility for the task team leader to the
individual line manager to enhance coordination with the technician, Safety, Reliability,
and Quality Assurance (SR&QA), etc. An updated standard practice instruction (SPI)
has been prepared to include other operational areas and a new schedule for
implementation is in work.
Procedures for tracking, analyzing, and providing corrective action for
hardware problems arising at KSC are complex and lengthy involving numerous entities.
There is no overall coordination effort to ensure that appropriate corrective action is
taken.
Recommendation #29" The Space Shuttle Program should establish a coordinating
function that is responsible for ensuring that proper and timely action is taken by
responsible organizations in correcting problems that occur during launch preparation.
NASA Re.s_oonse." Concur. A joint KSC/JSC problem process improvement team
chartered by the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has been formed to analyze the Orbiter
discrepant hardware/logistic processing flow. The sequence of events presently required
to process discrepant hardware is undergoing assessment to determine how best to
str.eamline and make the system more responsive. Recommended changes are scheduled
for presentation to the SSP in mid-1992. In addition, the Space Shuttle Critical Process
Improvement Team has completed a review of the current NASA management/
contractor interface relationships for logistics for all Space Shuttle elements. A report
identifying issues and corrective actions has been submitted to the Space Shuttle
Program.
The Shuttle Processing Data Management System II (SPDMS II) has not
yet provided many of its anticipated benefits. This may be because prospective users
have not been fully involved in its design. Various temporary subsystems have emerged
and are being used. However, these may be difficult to integrate into the final design.
Recommendation #30: Designers of the SPDMS II system should directly involve users
in the system's design and implementation. In particular, care should be exercised to
ensure that the various subsystems now being used successfully are included in the final
design.
NA._II Rea'po_nse." Concur. SPDMS II is being implemented as an evolutionary,
augmented replacement for existing data management capabilities. Project teams for the
four major functional projects, as identified in the Tactical Plan dated August 19, 1991,
have been formed. Each team is composed of contractor and NASA users, project office
personnel, and software developers, and is managed by the primary user of that function.
These teams have been in place since December 1991. All existing applications have
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been mapped to a functional project to assure that continuity exists between these
applications and new activities. Existing applications will be incorporated into or
replaced by these new activities. Management of this process by user led project teams
will ensure that SPDMS II provides the same or improved functionality when completed.
F_//IditlgJUL The Orbiter logistics and support program appears to be exhibiting a
steady trend of improvement. The component overhaul and repair facility has been
enhanced, and personnel skills have been upgraded. This has improved the control of
such issues as cannibalization, serviceable component spares levels, and replenishment of
spares stocks. However, support of Orbiter OV-105 (Endeavour) has caused extra effort
in the latter months of the year and undoubtedly will continue to do so in 1992.
Recommendation #31; This excellent program should be continued with particular
attention on the possible impacts of servicing OV-105.
NASA Response.- NASA agrees and realizes that the importance of the Space Shuttle
Program management's emphasis on all Space Shuttle Program assets is essential to
continued economic operations and safety of flight. Space Shuttle Program management
will continue to review all program assets distributions to assure proper levels of support
are available for the NASA fleet.
Coordination among NASA Centers and contractors on logistics and
support is excellent. This is due in large part to the activities of the Integrated Logistics
Panel (ILP), which meets at various locations at approximately 4-month intervals.
Recommendation #39- NASA should continue to support the excellent work being
performed by the ILP.
NASA Re.s_'po_nse: NASA agrees that the ILP is a good coordination medium that
facilitates the centralization of NASA Centers with their contractors for review and
reporting on their logistics activity.
Transfer of critical management skills and authority to the NASA Shuttle
Logistics Depot (NSLD) and to KSC under the Logistics Management Responsibility
Transfer (LMRT) Program is continuing. However, in some instances, funding
limitations are slowing the process. Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) documents that
establish details of transfer arrangements between such Centers as the Johnson Space
Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and KSC are being revised or
finalized.
Recommendation #33: It is important that the centralization of authority and equipment
at KSC continues as planned under the LMRT concept.
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NASA Response: Concur. This is an area of regular management review. Each logistics
management responsibility transfer (LMRT) recommendation is brought forward for the
Space Shuttle Program Director's approval after thorough scrutiny by the project
elements responsible for the hardware. Hardware, consumables, and expendables that
are sufficiently mature in design are the only items considered for transfer to KSC.
NSLD is consolidating its activities at Cocoa Beach _d=is having a
positive effect upon the critical issue of repair turn-around time (RTAT) for line
replaceable units (LRUs). It provides protection against threats Of Unavailability of
repaired or overhauled units in many cases in which the original manufacturers are no
longer providing support. RTAT data support the importance of the proximity of the
NSLD facilitie's to KSC.
Becommendation #34: The NSLD is essential to the efficient support of the Space
Shuttle fleet and should continue to be supported at its current level.
NASA Respo_ nse: Concur. This is an area that is reviewed by Space Shuttle Program
management annually through the POP budget reviews. The NASA Shuttle Logistics
Depot (NSLD) is expected to continue its growth as the Space Shuttle Program
continues to mature and vendors change.
F__ Cannibalization (or the removal of working components from an Orbiter
to meet shortages in another vehicle) has been the subject of much management
attention. With a few persistent exceptions such as auxiliary power units (APUs),
cannibalization rates now have been reduced to a commendably low level.
Recommendation #35: Maintain rigid controls on cannibalization. This will be
particularly important to accommodate the absorption of OV-105 into the operating fleet
next year.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA continues to review each cannibalization by screening
all inventory systems for availability prior to formal recommendation and presentation
for approval of cannibalization by the Space Shuttle Program Director. As the Space
Shuttle flight rate changes, the inventory levels are adjusted to meet Space Shuttle
Program's requirements.
F_ The reduction of component RTAT has been subjected to as much
management scrutiny as cannibalization and has, perhaps, an even greater economic and
support effect upon Orbiter capability.
Recommendation #36." There can be no relaxation of the vigilance entailed in the
pursuit of this cost-sensitive problem. Therefore, continue to keep the tightest control
over the RTAT problem.
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NASA Reapo_nse- Concur. This is an area of high visibility within the Space Shuttle
Program management. Each project element reviews their repair turnaround time
(RTAT) on a daily basis and reports to management as required. Workload
coordination, schedules, and needs of each contractor (repair agency) are reviewed
monthly and adjusted as their requirements are clarified.
The problem of stock inventory held at or below minimum established
levels is becoming critical. This is largely due to introduction of OV-105 and to major
modification programs to other Orbiters.
Recommendation #$7." Establish stocking recovery programs as soon as possible.
NASA Response: Concur. Since the delivery of Endeavour (OV-105), the below-
minimum balances have increased. This was part of the plan to expedite the delivery of
this vehicle. The established stocking levels will improve regularly as OV-105 hardware
is delivered. This will be monitored by Space Shuttle Program management to assure
availability of hardware necessary to meet the current flight rate.
The problem of providing replacements or substitutes for parts or
components that are now out of production will inevitably worsen with each passing year.
In many cases, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are unwilling or unable to
regenerate small batch production.
Recommatdaaon #38: It is essential to try to anticipate potential shortages before they
impact the program. Although this problem currently is being addressed by NASA,
increased management pressure is needed to avoid a potential launch rate problem in
the future.
NASA Re..wo_ns¢: Concur. There is a continuous effort by Space Shuttle Program
management within each project element to determine vendors and/or OEMs that are
projected for discontinuing production of Space Shuttle items. As these production
losses are identified, NASA is taking steps through the Assured Shuttle Availability
(ASA) processes to qualify alternate vendors and, where feasible, certify the NASA
Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) to perform the required maintenance and repair. The
Space Shuttle Program is developing a Parts Availability/Obsolescence Trend System
(PATS) to identify potential and actual problems.
The KSC Director of Shuttle Logistics has developed a list of critical items that could
adversely impact Shuttle Logistics support. These items are being purchased on a
priority basis to avoid potential shortages.
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C. AERONAUTICS
E//ld///g.J_." The Panel was pleased to note the promulgation on August 12, 1991, of
NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 7900.2 on aircraft operations management. This
NMI and a companion delineation of aviation safety requirements in the basic safety
manual are needed steps in the establishment of a total safety management organization
and Agency-wide philosophy of aviation safety for administrative aviation.
Recommendation #39: Incorporate aviation safety requirements in the basic safety
manual as soon as possible to ensure that NASA personnel have a common reference for
administrative aviation safety requirements. Completion of a Headquarters organization
to coordinate flight policies throughout NASA is needed.
NASA Re,sponse: Concur. In addition to publishing the NMI in August 1991, NASA also
developed two aircraft management operations handbooks that provide further detail on
aviation safety requirements. These handbooks have been approved and distributed.
Also, a revised Basic Safety Manual (NHB 1700.1) is in final review prior to publication.
Chapter 7 addresses aviation safety. The Aircraft Management Office has been elevated
to report directly to the Associate Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities,
and is responsible for coordinating flight policies throughout NASA. General J. Timothy
Boddie has been appointed to head this office.
.F_//id_IgA[_4_: Management of NASA's aeronautical flight research continues to place
strong emphasis on flight safety. Procedures for review and approval of the flight
programs [from project conception through Flight Readiness Reviews (FRRs)] are
adequate to ensure full awareness of the major safety issues involved in each project.
Recommendation #40: NASA's aeronautical flight research should continue to be given
strong support at appropriate levels to maintain a safe program for preserving the
nation's dominance in the aeronautical sciences.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA will continue its historical role in aeronautical flight
research. Improved procedures will be incorporated at every opportunity and lessons
learned will be implemented NASA-WIde. Safety remains the most important principle
in our aeronautical flight research programs.
L
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D. OTHER
E/t!ditlg/:_: Crew members working on the Space Shuttle for extended periods have
experienced difficulties achieving sufficient sleep. This problem is magnified when two
shift operations are conducted. These problems are similar to those experienced by
aircraft flight crews in long-haul operations.
Recommendation #41: NASA should support a program of research and
countermeasure development on crew rest cycles and circadian rhythm shifting to
support both Space Shuttle and Space Station operations. This program could be
modeled productively after the ongoing NASA aircrew research.
NASA Response.- Concur. NASA has an ongoing effort to better understand crew rest
cycles and circadian rhythm shifting in support of the Space Shuttle and Space Station
operations. Plans for acquiring and evaluating additional flight data will be developed
and implemented. In early 1990, NASA began a circadian cycle shift project to
investigate the issue of crew sleep quantity and quality from the crew perspective. This
project entailed meetings with government and academic experts in the areas of sleep
and circadian cycles, including NASA aircrew researchers, who examined existing Space
Shuttle flight procedures and developed recommendations for improvements. These
efforts were supported by mission tests of improved methods for effecting preflight sleep
and circadian shifting required to ensure crewmember alertness during critical flight
periods. The same techniques were applied to dual shift mission crews for the purpose
of shifting the "night team" to mission sleep times prior to launch. Sleep and circadian
cycles were effectively shifted and the techniques were well received by the
crewmembers. Preflight sleep and circadian shifting procedures have been a part of
routine Space Shuttle crew readiness preparations over the last 2 years and will continue
through the Space Station era.
E/tld/tlg..t._4_ Despite acknowledged examples of contributions to aviation safety analyses
through human factors research, NASA has not marshalled its resources in this field to
study similar problems in spaceflight orbital and ground operations. Efforts in this arena
have been stymied by a lack of appreciation of its potential value and the absence of
clear guidelines regarding programmatic responsibilities.
Recommendation #42, In view of the anticipated increase in manned spaceflight activity
during the present decade involving joint Space Shuttle and Space Station activities,
NASA's human factors resources should be marshalled and coordinated effectively to
address the problems of risk assessment and accident avoidance.
NASA Response.- Concur. NASA currently sponsors a pilot project at the Kennedy
Space Center to determine the value to the safety program of incorporating human
factors principles. This project focuses primarily on facility design and acquisition. The
Space Station Processing Facility has been selected to serve as a demonstration vehicle.
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Draft guidelines havebeen developed and are being tested in the pilot project prior to
publication and NASA-wide implementation.
NASA has a hierarchy of reporting systems for mishaps and incidents that
defines investigation procedures/responsibilities and provides for developing lessons
learned. These reporting systems function quite well for relatively serious accidents,
incidents, mishaps, and near-misses. NASA does not have a system analogous to the
Federal Aviation Agency's (FAA's) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) for
collecting self-reports of human errors that do not lead to an otherwise reportable event.
Recommendation #43: NASA should examine ways to encourage self-reports of human
errors and to analyze and learn from data and trends in these reports. Inclusion of
coverage of the need for human-error reporting in task team training with an associated
method for analyzing the reports could prove to be an excellent method for collecting
this information.
NASA Respo_nse: Concur with intent. NASA encourages open communication, employee
interaction, and the development of attitudes of personal responsibility for work
performed through application of Total Quality Management techniques. However, we
do not see a need to adopt the FAA system which applies to multiple airlines in multiple
locations. For the number of aircraft and limited locations NASA has, our current
reporting systems combined with personal responsibility have been effective.
Fj/Id//Ig..,_./_ The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) program was plagued by two quality
control problems during the year. One problem was a failure of the bonding betweea
the rotor of the vernier motor and the cork clutch material. The other problem was
associated with an error in identifying heat treating requirements for 15-5 stainless steel.
Installed components using this steel that was not heat treated should require a waiver
before clearance to fly is granted. Failure of i5-5 steel pins in the concentric damper
negator motor or tower tabs could potentially impact safety.
Recommendation #44; A complete review of the TSS quality assurance program should
be conducted before flight in addition to the already initiated examination of the
suitability of the suspect parts.
NASA Response." It is highly unlikely that this additional audit would result in any new
significant information. An examination of available data and processes indicates that
both the combined MSFC and Headquarters review of the TSS quality system
collectively represent adequate reviews. MSFC reviews, which were the source of
identification of the materials problems, have been thorough. The TSS Quality i
Assurance Program has undertaken several audits in the period 1986 through 1991
including two safety critical structure audits, one of which resulted in identification of the
condition A 15-5 PH material and configuration inspections. A special audit was
conducted in November 1991 to address contractor materials and procurement
procedures attendant to situations identified with the vernier motor clutch and 15-5 PH
steel. The quality systems that were considered to be prime contributors to the materials
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procurement issueshave been reviewed. Steps have been taken to ensure that
implementation of the recommended procedures in the quality systems are performed
correctly by all personnel concerned.
There is no flight safety issue and all problems identified by the above, existing quality
systems have been resolved to the satisfaction of the senior NASA management. Code
Q will continue to periodically review the quality systems to ensure that their capabilities
are maintained at required levels.
Existing plans for Space Shuttle missions such as the Hubble Space
Telescope (HST) repair, and the assembly and maintenance of the downsized SSF,
highlight potential benefits from the use of an improved spacesuit and extravehicular
mobility unit (EMU) to replace the existing suit and portable life support system (PLSS).
Limitations inherent in the design of the present system could pose operational for safety
problems on these and future missions. The AX-5 and Mark 3 research and
development programs have provided an excellent basis for implementing a new,
improved design for extravehicular activity (EVA) equipment. Compatibility of the new
suit designs with the existing PLSS potentially provides a cost-effective upgrade path.
Recommendation #45: NASA should reconsider the specification and development of a
new suit and EMU based on the information developed in the AX-5 and Mark 3
programs. NASA should acknowledge the need for a new suit and EMU as soon as
possible and establish its development and implementation schedule consistent with
budget availability. Use of a new suit with the existing PISS specifically should be
examined as an interim safety improvement step.
NASA Response: In the near term, through the initial assembly of the Space Station
Freedom, the existing Space Shuttle suit is capable of safely meeting all known
operational requirements. Specification and development of a new suit and EMU will
be undertaken as requirements become better defined and funding becomes available.
NASA rejects this recommendation per the following rationale. First, over 10 years of
astronaut EVA training for HST and Space Station assembly missions has not revealed
any operational, design, or safety problems related to performing any necessary EVA
using the existing Space Shuttle EMU system. The Space Shuttle EMU works well and
is a proven safe system. Second, the AX-5 and Mark 3 systems must be recognized for
exactly what they are. They were strictly R&D programs and neither prototype suit was
intended to be flight capable. Indeed, many additional years effort would be required to
turn these designs into flight systems. AX-5 and Mark 3 have served well as proving
grounds for new suit concepts; in fact, several unique design features have been
identified that are under review for potential future incorporation into the existing Space
Shuttle EMU.
Determinants of the risk of bends during EVA activities have not been
fully researched. Existing prebreathing protocols are based on ground-based pressure
chamber tests and scuba diving tables. A significant safety uncertainty could be removed
if the specific effects of micro-gravity EVA conditions on nitrogen bubble formation were
determined and documented.
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IL_ommendation #46: NASA should support the research necessary to characterize
more fully the bends risk associated with micro-gravity EVA activities using its extensive
expertise at the research centers and the data collection opportunities available during
on-ground simulations and Space Shuttle flights.
NASA Response: Concur. Current prebreathe protocols are based on data from more
than 1200 altitude chamber runs and space flight EVA experiences gathered over the last
15 years. NASA has in place ongoing bends risk assessment research activities
performing continuous updates to this data based on manned vacuum chamber tests,
EVA training events and on-orbit EVA activities. In addition, a program is in work to
develop a portable bubble detector for use during on-orbit EVA activities to characterize
zero gravity effects on bends risk.
NASA has dedicated a significant amount of research and development to exploring the
physiological effects of the partial atmospheres experienced during space flight EVA
activity. NASA will continue to research the health effects of EVA activity as a function
of length and intensity, both of which are strictly controlled. This research includes crew
health monitoring during Space Shuttle missions and basic life science experiments
conducted at NASA research centers.
7
B-26
APPENDIX C
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL ACTIVITIES
JANUARY 1992 - JANUARY 1993
28 Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Software, Iuka, MS
30-31 Automation Science Research Facility, Ames Research Center
RI .a.gI2AKY
18-19 Space Shuttle Orbiter Autoland, Ames Research Center
18-19 Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee, NASA Headquarters
27 Space Shuttle Orbiter Autoland, Rockwell, Downey, CA
9-14 Integrated Logistics Panel, Thiokol, Brigham City, UT
10 HL 20 Program, Langley Research Center
17 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report to NASA Administrator and
Congressional Staff, Washington, DC
2 Assured Crew Return Vehicle, Johnson Space Center
22 Redesign Solid Rocket Motor, Thiokol, Brigham, UT
22 STS-49 Flight Readiness Review, Kennedy Space Center
29 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Activities Discussion with Acting Deputy
Administrator, NASA Headquarters
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12-13
16
18-20
20
21
27
27
Space Station and Panel Update with Administrator, NASA Headquarters
STS-49 Endeavor Landing, Dryden Flight Research Facility
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Discussions with
Programs Assurance Director, NASA Headquarters
Auxiliary Power Unit, Sundstrand, Rockford, IL
Assured Crew Return Vehicle, Johnson Space Center
.Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Discussions, Lewis
Research Center
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Discussions with NASA
Headquarters Officials
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Advanced Solid Rocket Motor, Marshall Space
Flight Center
5 Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Discussions, NASA
Headquarters
16-17 Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel, NASA Headquarters
22-24 Aerospace Medical Advisory Committee, NASA Headquarters
14
15
16
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Discussions, NASA
Headquarter_ _::::
Space Shuttle Main Engine; Advanced Solid Rocket Motor; National Launch
System; National Aerospace Plane Program; Test Technology; Center Overview,
Stennis Space Center
Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER) and Mission Control Center, Johnson
Space Center
Autoland Demonstration, White Sands
C-2
20-24
28
29
29
SpaceShuttle Main Engine AssessmentTeam, Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, CA
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Discussions with
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality, NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Enhancements with Associate Administrator for Space Flight,
NASA Headquarters
Aircraft Operations with Director, Aircraft Operations, NASA Headquarters
24-28
5-6 Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment, Marshall Space Flight Center
18-21 lntercenter Aircraft Operations Panel, Johnson Space Flight Center
18 Flight Research Programs, Dryden Flight Research Center
20 Space Suits, Space Shuttle Autoland Simulation Demonstration and Human
Factors, Ames Research Center
Integrated Logistics Panel, Kennedy Space Center
1 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Update to NASA Administrator and Deputy
Administrator, NASA Headquarters
2 Space Council, Crystal City, VA
15-17 Space Shuttle Processing and Operations, Kennedy Space Center
15-17 Advanced Technology Advisory Committee, Johnson Space Center
29-30 Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment, Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, CA
1-2 Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment, Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, CA
8 Space Station Freedom Work Package 2, McDonnell Douglas Company,
Huntington Beach, CA
9 Space Shuttle Orbiter, Rockwell, Downey, CA
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19-20 AerospaceMedicine Advisory Committee, NASA Headquarters
26-28 SpaceShuttle and SpaceStationPrograms,JohnsonSpaceCenter
27 Autoland Update with Acting Deputy Administrator, JohnsonSpaceCenter
4-5 SpaceShuttle Main Engine AssessmentTeam, Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, CA
10 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Activities Update to NASA Administrator and
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality, NASA Headquarters
16-19 Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel, Seattle, WA
34
7-8
15
Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment Team, NASA Headquarters
Kennedy Space Center Training Program, Kennedy Space Center
Space Shuttle Autoland, NASA Administrator, NASA Headquarters
15 Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment Team Report to Center and Contractors,
Marshall Space Flight Center
27 Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment Team Report to NASA Administrator,
NASA Headquarters
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APPENDIX D
ASSESSMENT OF THE JUSTIFICATION AND MISSION
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ASSURED CREW RETURN VEHICLE

NationalAeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
Reply to Attn of Q-1
July 2, 1992
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit to you the report of its
working group, co-chaired by Mr. Richard D. Blomberg and Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, on the
Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) for the Space Station Freedom. This report has
been reviewed by the entire Panel membership and reflects its consensus that a single-
purpose ACRV is justified and the mission requirements developed by the ACRV Project
are realistic and appropriate as a basis for ACRV system requirements.
The working group appreciates the cooperation given it by the ACRV Project Office and
the Space Station Freedom Program in the performance of this assessment.
Representatives of the ASAP working group would be pleased to meet with you if you have
any questions concerning this report.
Verv truly yours, .-, f_
"_J <-o" ,-A. ,eO--_.-_,Z./
Norman R. Parmet
Chairman, Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The NASA Administrator requested that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel conduct an
independent review of the justification and mission requirements for an Assured Crew Return
Vehicle (ACRV) for the Space Station Freedom (SSF). A working group of the Panel was
established to conduct the assessment. This group reviewed applicable documents and met with the
ACRV Project Office staff and its two study contractors. The Panel was gratified to observe that
the Project has adopted as its governing philosophy that the ACRV system should satisfy the
objective of being Simple, Affordable, Reliable and Available which it embodies in the acronymSARA.
A review of the histories of vehicle systems and installations that operate under conditions
analogous to SSF (e.g., submarines, naval surface vessels, other manned space flights and remote
bases such as those in Antarctica) indicates that there are three types of circumstances that require
emergency evacuation of some or all of their personnel. These are: 1) a medical emergency; 2) an
accident which renders the installation uninhabitable; and 3) inability to resupply the installation.
Data from the experiences of such analogous systems indicate that the frequencies of occurrence of
emergency events such as those noted above are sufficiently high to justify the need for providing
a "lifeboat" capability for SSF.
The ACRV Project Office has let contracts for definition and preliminary design of such a
"lifeboat" system. Based on the set of emergencies noted above, the Project Office developed three
Design Reference Missions (DRMs) and their attendant constraints to guide the contractors' efforts.
The DRMs, which parallel the set of emergencies, are described in a set of formal documents
providing: performance (functional) requirements, rationales for the requirements, operations
concept and a data book. The Panel finds that the DRMs are sound in their content and, aided by
the supporting documents, provide excellent definition of the ACRV system requirements. The
Panel notes, however, that there is a probability that DRM-1, medical emergency, may co-exist with
DRM-2, SSF system accident requiring immediate evacuation, and suggests that this overlap be
examined to determine its effects on the design of the ACRV system.
An open issue, currently being studied by the ACRV Project, is whether the landing sites
should be on land, on water or both. An important factor is whether the available Search and
Rescue (SAR) forces can meet the time lines required for the medical emergency of DRM-1. It
would appear that the ACRV must be designed for a return to land while preserving the capability
of a water landing.
The Panel concludes that development of an ACRV system is justified, and the defined
mission requirements are appropriate. To provide the maximum assurance of crew safety, the
ACRV must be available and operable when needed. The Project Office has established an
availability of 0.997 as the goal for the ACRV system. An analysis shows that, with hardware of
reasonably obtainable reliability yielding an individual craft availability of 0.950, the ACRV system
must comprise two vehicles each with full crew capacity in order to meet this system availability goal.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
NASA has always provided the capability for the safe return of astronauts continuously
throughout space missions. For Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Space Shuttle missions, the return
capability was inherent because the crew stayed with the reentry vehicle. During the Skylab
Program, the Apollo capsule remained docked with the orbiting laboratory to provide a return
capability on demand.
The Space Station Freedom (SSF) presents a new challenge for maintaining a continuous
crew return capability. The orbiting station is designed to be self sufficient for extended periods of
time between visits by the Space Shuttle. When the Shuttle is not docked with SSF, no crew return
capability is present unless a separate reentry vehicle or "lifeboat" is provided. This vehicle, although
not yet fully defined, has come to be known as an Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV).
In February 1992, former NASA Administrator, Richard H. Truly, in a letter to Mr. Norman
R. Parmet, chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), requested that the Panel
independently review the justification and mission requirements for an ACRV. This request was
reaffirmed by the present NASA Administrator, Daniel S. Goldin, during a meeting with Mr. Parmet
in May 1992. In response, a working group of ASAP members and consultants was formed to
examine the ACRV justification, mission requirements and resulting system performance
requirements to determine if they justify the inclusion of an ACRV in the SSF design. This working
group gathered information from the ACRV Project Office, SSF Program and Project personnel and
the two contractors (Lockheed and Rockwell) who are presently involved in ACRV preliminary
design. This report presents the findings and recommendations of that working group.
This report focuses on the justification for an ACRV and an assessment of the mission
requirements which have been proposed for it. Observations are included on the system
performance requirements which have been developed in response to those mission needs. No
attempt was made as part of this study to examine systematically specific design or configuration
alternatives. Meetings with the two competing contractors were held only to determine the extent
to which the mission requirements and functional performance specifications were realistic and
supportive of the need for an ACRV.
2.0 JUSTIFICATION
Several generic options have been proposed to provide the SSF with an assured crew return
capability. These range from a dedicated, single purpose vehicle docked with the SSF to a "launch
on demand" ground-based Shuttle to rescue crew members. NASA has established an ACRV Project
Office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) to examine alternatives and manage any resulting ACRV
definition and development efforts. As part of its work, the ACRV Project examined a range of
possible contingencies which might require the availability and use of an ACRV. If one or more of
these circumstances were sufficiently likely to occur and could lead to loss of life among the crew,
the deployment of an ACRV would be justified.
After enumerating various theoretical possibilities, the ACRV Project examined analogous
situations from space flight and earth-bound activities to help assess their likelihood of occurrence
and potential severity. It was determined that three situations could arise which would require the
on-orbit presence of a return capability. These were a medical emergency due to illness or injury
to a crew member, an emergency which renders the Space Station uninhabitable and the
=unavailability of the Space Shuttle, which is the only ground based vehicle capable of reaching the
SSF and transporting its crew. Each of these contingencies was deemed credible and was expected
to occur multiple times over the 30 year operational life of the Space Station.
Since scenarios were identified which supported the need for an ACRV, the Project
concluded that its development was justified. It then proceeded to define the specific mission
requirements that an ACRV design would have to meet.
3.0 MISSION REQUIREMENTS
In order to guide the development of an ACRV, the Project Office translated the three
contingencies it identified as justifying an ACRV into specific design reference missions (DRMs).
These are:
• DRM-I - Return of an ill or injured crew member for treatment on the ground
• DRM-2 - Total evacuation of the SSF in the event that it becomes uninhabitable due
to events such as a fire, toxic spill or loss of life support capability
• DRM-3 - Return of the entire crew if the Space Shuttle becomes unavailable.
Each of these design reference missions is supported by analyses of the probability of their
occurrence over the planned 30 year lifetime of the Space Station Freedom.
3.1 DRM-I: Medical Evacuation
The possible need for a medical evacuation was assessed by the ACRV Project through an
examination of analogous populations including U.S. and Soviet space flight, U.S. Navy seaborBe
experience and long duration Antarctic expeditions. The estimated need for medical evacuations
of Space Station varies somewhat depending on which analog population is used. The ACRV
Project has adopted a rate of seven medical evacuations over the 30 year SSF life for planning
purposes. This rate appears to be well justifiable from the available data. Even if this rate is
overstated by a considerable amount, there appears to be an extremely high likelihood that multiple
medical evacuations will be needed over a 30 year SSF life.
As presently conceived, DRM-1 requires that an ill or injured crew member reach a critical
care facility on the ground within 24 hours of the time that the injured person is stabilized and
declared ready for transport. This 24 hour timeline allows for the possibility of significant on-orbit
loiter time so that the landing can be targeted for a preferential landing site. The timeline provides
for a maximum of three hours between the time of landing and the arrival of the patient at a critical
care facility (up to one hour for removal and two hours for transport). This latter requirement likely
represents a significant challenge for a water landing situation.
The 24 hour timeline has been developed with extensive inputs from the medical community.
This is the maximum allowable time that is considered to be consistent with the basic objective of
restoring the injured or ill crew member to a healthy state. It is acknowledged, however, that a more
timely arrival at the care facility would be preferred if its achievement did not compromise some of
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theotherparametersassociatedwith DRM-1suchasimpactG-loads.It thereforemightbebetter
to expressthe DRM-1 requirements in terms of reaching an appropriate care facility for the illness
or injury in question as soon as possible after stabilization but in no event later than 24 hours.
Finally, DRM-1 does not inherently require that all crew members be evacuated from the
SSF. It is assumed that the "patient" will be accompanied by at least one and perhaps two other
crew members to operate the ACRV and/or render emergency medical care during the reentry. The
assumption is that the Space Station can accommodate the balance of the crew if they elect to stay
and such a reduced crew complement is permitted by mission rules. These rules will likely include
the necessity of having an available ACRV of acceptable reliability with a capacity sufficient to
return the remaining crew.
3.2 DRM-2: Space Station Emergency Evacuation
DRM-2 covers a situation in which the entire crew must be evacuated from the Space Station
due to an emergency resulting from system failures, meteoroid or debris impacts or other threats
(fire, collision, accident, toxic spill, etc.) which render the Station temporarily or permanently
uninhabitable. Detailed estimates of the probabilities of these various events are underway or
contemplated as more data become available. Current preliminary Project estimates range from the
need for 4.3 evacuations in 30 years based on U.S. manned space flight experience to 6 evacuations
in 30 years if U.S. Navy submarine abort surfacing data are considered. The ACRV Project is using
the lower estimate for its planning purposes. This may be somewhat of an understatement of the
real frequency of DRM-2 occurrence because the analyses reviewed by the ASAP would appear to
underestimate the probability of inadvertent crew operations during 30 years of operations bymultiple crews.
The DRM-2 scenario calls for the capability of a complete evacuation and separation of the
ACRV from the SSF within three minutes of the beginning of the crew's ingress to the ACRV. This
rapid departure is considered necessary to protect the crew from the effects of any emergency whichprompted the evacuation.
3.3 DRM-3." Shuttle Unavailable
The ACRV Project has realistically addressed the possibility that the Space Shuttle will
become unavailable as a means of transporting a healthy crew back to earth at the end of its normal
duty time on Space Station. The Shuttle could become unavailable due to a problem with the
vehicle itself (e.g., another accident) or as a result of losing a critical support facility such as the
Mission Control Center (MCC), Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) or both launching pads. Natural
disasters such as hurricanes, accidents and hostile acts could each lead to a Shuttle system which was
unavailable to retrieve a crew from the Space Station.
Currently, there are no detailed estimates of the probability of occurrence of the various
scenarios which could lead to DRM-3. The ACRV Project has examined various ways of estimating
the potential loss of Shuttle availability over a 30 year period. These include the failure estimates
prepared specifically for the Galileo mission and the demonstrated failure rate based on the loss of
the 51-L mission and the actual number of flights actually completed. This has led the Program to
consider a range of between three and eight required ACRV missions over 30 years to compensatefor Shuttle unavailability.
4.0 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
As part of the assessment of the need for an ACRV, the system performance requirements
were examined to obtain additional insights into mission requirements and to ascertain if the
functional definition of the system was consistent with the design reference missions.
The functional requirements for the ACRV system are contained in the System Performance
Requirements Document (SPRD) prepared by the ACRV Project Office. This document is an
excellent example of well defined functional requirements which clearly flow down from the design
reference missions but do not presuppose a design solution. The ACRV Project is to be
complimented on the excellent requirements analyses and documentation it has provided as well as
its overall design philosophy. This philosophy is promoted through the acronym, SARA, which the
program has adopted as a reminder that the design should be simple, available, reliable and
affordable. It is also noteworthy that the ACRV Project has encompassed all phases of a potential
ACRV mission from prelaunch operations through launch, rendezvous and SSF attachment, attached
operations, flight and landing to recovery and post recovery. This should help ensure a realistic
program development with adequate consideration of life cycle costs.
The ACRV performance requirements are predicated on a design assumption of minimal
crew intervention for separation from the Space Station, targeting, reentry and recovery. The crew
is considered able to initiate actions and, perhaps, intervene to stop an automatic sequence but is
not expected to take an active role in ACRV guidance or system reconfiguration. This appears to
be a totally reasonable and necessary view of crew capability since the crew complement, health state
and extent of deconditioning are unknowns for any particular ACRV mission. The design reference
missions and 30 year projected life of SSF provide further support for a set of requirements which
do not rely on human piloting and systems skills. The analogy used by the ACRV Project of the
crew entering an elevator and pushing the "down" button seems particularly apt for the defined
mission environment.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The review by the ASAP working group has led to conclusions and recommendations with
respect to the justification for an ACRV and its deployment configuration. In addition, observations
related to several areas of system performance requirements were developed.
5.1 Justification and Mission Requirements
It is the opinion of the ASAP that the three basic contingencies used by the ACRV Project
to justify the need for an ACRV are credible and do, in fact, support a Space Station requirement
for an on-orbit crew return vehicle. Further, the design reference missions arising from the basic
contingencies individually and collectively justify the deployment of an ACRV with the Space Station.
The probability of occurrence for each of the DRMs is sufficiently high to warrant providing a
simple, reliable way to return the crew safely to earth without relying on the Space Shuttle. Further,
the potentially fatal consequences of not having an ACRV given the almost certain need for it during
the 30 year operational life of the Space Station are totally unacceptable risks when the provision
of a simple "lifeboat" system can virtually ensure their avoidance. There is nothing inherent in the
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design or operation of the SSF which should alter NASA's longstanding policy of providing a
continuous "way home" for the astronauts.
Although the three DRMs cover the obvious contingencies, it is believed that the
simultaneous occurrence of DRM-1 and DRM-2 is also quite probable. Simply, it is considered likely
that many of the emergencies which will result in the need for a rapid, DRM-2 evacuation will also
involve one or more injured crew members. This overlap has significant implications for the
functional requirements of the ACRV in such areas as its on-board medical systems, ingress
capability for injured crew members and mission timelines. It is recommended that the implications
of simultaneous DRM-1 and DRM-2 scenarios be given more attention as the requirements arefurther refined.
5.2 Number and Capacity Needed
In addition to justifying the existence of an ACRV, the design reference missions together
with the performance requirements for reliability and availability lead to a strong conclusion
concerning the number of ACRVs which must be stationed on-orbit and the capacity of each ACRV.
Regardless of whether the SSF's permanently manned configuration (PMC) ultimately involves a
crew of four or eight astronauts, only three "generic" on-orbit deployment configurations appear
possible. This is because the SSF design provides docking ports for a maximum of two ACRVs when
it reaches PMC. These three deployment configurations are:
• A single ACRV with the capacity to transport the entire crew complement
Two ACRVs each of which can transport at least half of the crew but less than the
full crew
• Two ACRVs each of which is capable of accommodating the entire crew.
A single ACRV with less than a total crew capacity is precluded by both DRM-2 and DRM-3 which
require a total Station evacuation.
At present, the system performance requirements provide for an ACRV system operational
availability (Ao) of 0.997. Ao for a single ACRV is simply its own operational availability. For a two
vehicle system each of which has less than a full crew capacity, A,, is the product of the individual
vehicle's operational availabilities. Since these vehicles would likely be identical, this would be the
square of a single vehicle's A,,. The operational availability for a deployment of two identical
vehicles each with full crew capacity is one minus the square of the unavailability of an individual
vehicle. When A,, is calculated for any deployment of two ACRVs, it assumes that the crew always
has the capability to reach both ACRVs with equivalent safety. This may not be the case,
particularly for DRM-2. However, examining availability using this assumption is a reasonable
simplification.
When these formulas are applied to the three generic deployment configurations, an
interesting pattern emerges as indicated in the table on the next page which shows system A,, as a
function of individual vehicle A,,. It can be seen from this table that the single full crew vehicle must
itself have an Ao of 0.997 to meet the present criterion while the configuration with two full crew
ACRVs can achieve a system Ao greater than 0.997 with an individual vehicle A_ of only 0.950, a
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Zmuch more realistically achievable reliability. Further, two ACRVs of less than full crew capacity
cannot meet the performance criterion even if the individual vehicle A_ is, itself, 0.997. In fact, this
configuration would require an individual vehicle Ao in excess of 0.998 to meet a system A,, criterion
of 0.997.
Ao by Deployment Configuration
A_ of Single ACRV
Vehicle Single ACRV
Full Crew Size
0.800 0.800
0.850 0.850
0.900 0.900
0.950 0.950
0.960 0.960
0.970 0.970
0.980 0.980
0.990 0.990
0.995 0.995
o99 
2 ACRVs
Each < Full Crew
0.640
0.723
0.810
0.903
0.922
0.941
0.960
0.980
0.990
0.994
2 ACRVs
Each > = Full Crew
0.9600
0.9775
0.9900
i!ii!iii!!i iiii!! i  liiiii!iiiii!iiiiiiiiiii!i
0.9984
0.9991
0.9996
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
Given the foregoing considerations, it is concluded that safely completing the design reference
missions can only be realistically accomplished by placing two ACRVs on the Space Station each of
which has the capacity to transport the full crew complement. This conclusion is considered
independent of any acceptable specification for system operational availability. Since there are
current plans to accommodate a crew of eight in the final Space Station configuration, this would
imply that the deployed ACRV system should be composed of two eight person vehicles attached
to the SSF plus at least one assembled and flight-qualified spare to ensure that an ACRV, once
utilized, can be replaced in a reasonable period of time without the necessity of maintaining a rapid
refurbishment capability.
5.3 Observations
As part of the system performance requirements review, several points were raised by the
ASAP working group members as worthy of additional consideration. As mentioned above, these
were not the result of an in-depth requirements analysis but were simply consensus impressions
based on the particular information which was briefed to the Panel. Specific points which it is
recommended that the program consider are:
• Land versus water landing - The present requirements are not firm with respect to
the capability of the ACRV to land on water, land or both. Given the compressed
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time requirementsfor locating,extricatingandtransportingan injuredcrewmember
imposedby DRM-1, it wouldappearthat the ACRV mustbe capableof a land
landing.Thesignificantlygreateravailabilityof waterlandingsites,however,suggests
that the systemshouldalso be capable of a safe water landing.
ELV Launch - The present requirements provide that the ACRV be designed to a
"generic" expendable launch vehicle (ELV) environment to retain the option of an
ELV launch if this capability is added to the SSF in the future. It would appear
prudent to provide for a specific existing ELV launch capability as early as possible
to reduce the logistics load on the Shuttle and ensure the inherent design
compatibility of the ACRV and the ELV.
Reusability - The generic concept of reusability is inherent in the system performance
design requirements. Reuse or refurbishment is encompassed by the requirements.
While it does appear logical that many high value items can and should be reused,
the ultimate decision concerning reusability should await a final design solution.
Moreover, it is important that any decision to provide for refurbishment be made on
the basis of a detailed cost benefit analysis which includes appropriate consideration
of the cost of establishing and maintaining the refurbishment and component
manufacturing infrastructures for 30 years.
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